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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyse which company specific factors that affect the capital structure in 
the airline industry. Our sample consists of 39 airlines from different parts of the 
world, and data is collected from the last decade. We will use previous empirical 
studies of capital structure as a reference when interpreting the results from our 
sample. 
 
In the first section of this paper, we will present the airline industry and the main 
capital structure theories.  
 
We are going to use an econometric approach when analysing our data sample. Our 
dependent variables are the book or the market debt ratio in the two different models. 
The independent variables consist of company specific factors as: size, profit, growth, 
tangibility of assets, leasing, financial strength, strategy, ownership situation and 
transparency. Some interesting findings are that the market model explains 31.1% of 
the variation in capital structure of airline companies, and that six out of seven 
independent variables are significant. The book model does only explain 18.5%, and 
have only one significant variable. This may be explained by the argumentation that 
the market model are more forward looking than the book model which imply that 
stakeholders base their decision on the future expectations rather than historical 
values.   
 
Generally, there are many theories that deal with capital structure issues, and we are 
going to test whether some of them are superior for our sample. Our findings show 
that none of the mentioned models are able to fully explain the obtained results, which 
is in line with the common consensus. 	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1.	  Industry	  
1.1	  Motivation	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  topic	  
 
After four and half years as a student of subjects concerning economics and business 
administration we have gotten many different interesting topics to choose from when 
preparing our master thesis. Since we both have specialization in financial economics, 
this was set as a base when choosing the topic. We have also studied subjects from 
econometrics and business analysis and performance that we wanted to include in our 
thesis. Capital structure in an energy intensive industry was both a relevant and 
interesting topic. After some back and forth we ended up choosing the airline industry 
as a representative of an energy intensive industry.  
 
We found the airline industry interesting because of its’ importance in economy and 
world globalization. It provides services everywhere in the world and give people the 
opportunity to visit places that formally would be thought of as almost impossible. 
Few other industries get that much attention from the government, media and the 
public. One explanation concerning this extra attention may be the airline industry’s 
importance in linking the world together. The airline industry has been a popular topic 
in Norway because of the rivalry in the Norwegian market, Norwegian Airlines large 
order of new aircrafts and the high rate of employee vs. company disagreements. 
 
We found no previous studies about capital structure in the airline industry, and 
thought it would be interesting to test if the airline industry has the same influencing 
factors as previous studies in general. The airline industry is highly energy intensive 
because of the large fuel consumption. The volatility in fuel prices, adds to the normal 
operational risk and we wanted to see if it influenced the capital structure choices. 
The airline industry is also capital intensive because of the need for large investments 
in planes and other fixed assets. The management have to choose from different 
financial sources when raising capital for these large investments. Hence, we got the 
possibility to test which factors, if any, which influence capital structure behaviour in 
a capital and energy intensive industry.  
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1.2	  Problems	  we	  want	  to	  address	  
We will in this thesis address the capital structure behaviour of airline companies. In 
order to do this, we have to investigate which company specific factors (if any) that 
have a significant relationship with the companies’ capital structure. We are also 
going to investigate whether there are some of the classical capital structure theories 
that can explain our findings. Furthermore we are going to examine whether our 
results correspond well with other capital structure analysis, and if there are airline 
industry specific deviations. 
 
The problems to be addressed: 
What are the determinants of capital structure in the airline industry? Do our 
obtained results correspond well with other studies and capital structure theories? 
1.3	  Scope	  and	  limitations	  
Before going any further, it will be appropriate to address some limitations 
concerning our paper. We are going to use a selection of recent studies and analysis 
when writing this paper. This is not because we are going to question their findings, 
but rather because we want to compare their result with ours. By doing this we want 
to produce a higher degree of understanding concerning capital structure issues. 
Hence, this is not a critic or review of other studies. 
 
The term capital structure refers to the mixture of debt and equity that fund a 
company’s assets. Although many previous studies have analysed the composition 
and design of different types of debt and equity, this will not be deliberated in our 
thesis. 
 
The theories included have been chosen on the basis of what we regard as the most 
relevant for capital structure. They are highly recognised and often used as a basis in 
capital structure research. Generally, the theories included have proven to be the ones 
most recognized when explaining capital structure.  
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1.4	  Outline	  
We will begin this thesis with a short presentation of the airline industry 
characteristics and history because we want the reader to get a picture of the airline 
industry before we start our analysis.  
 
Then we will present theory in order to predict and explain capital structure 
determinants. Next we will present and give motivation for variables that we believe 
to be relevant for firm’s debt ratio. We would also present previous empirical findings 
regarding the variables, which we would use to compare and analyse our findings. 
 
In the next section we will describe our data sample and discuss its limitations. 
Further we will present the econometric method, which we would later use in our 
analysis. 
 
In the analysis and result section we would first present the descriptive statistics from 
our sample. Then we present our first statistical testing using the pooled OLS 
regression. Lastly we will present our FE results and how the predictions of the 
presented capital structure theories is in line with our obtained results. 
 
Lastly we would give a concluding remark on the obtained results in our thesis, and 
give suggestions to future research.      
 
	  1.5	  Industry	  definition	  
Airline/Aviation industry, the business of transporting paying passengers and freight 
by air along regularly scheduled routes, typically by airplanes but also by helicopter. 
(Freedictionary.) We limit our sample by leaving out the helicopter part of the 
industry. Hence, when we mention airline/aviation industry, helicopters are not 
included. 
 
1.6	  Industry	  characteristics	  
The largest income in the airline industry comes from passenger services. We have 
also chosen to focus on airlines that are mainly normal passenger services and not air 
cargo firms (even though some of the firms have smaller cargo services, it is hard to 
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separate the different costs from annual report. Also many of the airlines are 
controlled by a parent company and include different subsidiaries.)  
 
Since the largest part of the revenue comes from passenger service the airlines are 
dependent on consumer and business confidence. A family will go on vacation when 
they feel they have good enough economy to treat themselves with something extra. 
Hence flying, which is often included in a vacation, could be seen as luxury good for 
leisure travellers. When the consumer confidence drops, you would expect lower 
demand for leisure travels. Consumer confidence is measured by “an unique indicator 
formed from survey results of more than 5,000 households and designed to gauge the 
relative financial health, spending power and confidence of the average consumer” 
(Investopedia, Consumer Confidence). 
 
An important aspect of passenger service is the business traveller, since they are more 
likely to fly more frequently than for example the vacation (leisure) passenger. 
Airlines try to the get the loyalty of business passengers by using for example 
frequent flyer programs. One example is Qantas Frequent flyer program where you 
can earn points by flying with Qantas, use Direct Earn credit or charge card or shop 
with their partners. The points can be used to fly, priority check-in and a Qantas Club 
membership (Qantas). 	  By earning more points the benefits become larger and gives 
the customer more incentive to fly with Qantas once more. Business travellers are 
also more likely to purchase the upgraded services that would give the airline higher 
margin on their service. They are also not that price sensitive, which is the degree to 
what the price of a product affects consumers purchasing behaviours (Investopedia, 
Price-sensitivity), and the demand would not fall that much in an economic downturn.  
 
Fuel has, in the last couple of years, become the largest single cost for the airlines. 
Globally, the airline industry has a bill of US$ 178 billion in 2011, which accounts for 
30 per cent of operating expenses (IATA, Airline Industry Fuel Consumption, 2011).  
Fuel consumption efficiency is important and has acquired an increasing attention 
from airline manufacturers. Therefore, new airplanes have become more fuel-
efficient. This has severe consequences for airlines with older fleets because airlines 
like Ryan Air, with its new airline fleet, have a lower jet fuel cost per kilometre. 
Routes over longer distances will also have lower average jet fuel cost, since take-off 
and landing use much more jet fuel than in the air cruise.  
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Table	  1:	  Fuel	  prices	  and	  operating	  costs	  
	   	  
Source: (IATA, Airline Industry Fuel Consumption, 2011) 
 
As shown in table 1, fuel expenses (crude oil) went from 14 per cent to an expected 
32 per cent of operating costs in less than ten years. This is partially caused by the rise 
in average price of crude oil, but also that airlines have been making cost reductions 
in other operational expenses like wages. Figure 1 shows how the rise in crude oil 
price affected the net profits of the airline industry. Another interesting finding in this 
figure is that the net profits of 2001 to 2004 are negative, but the negative profits 
decrease even though crude oil prices have been rising. One interpretation of this is 
that airlines have been making cost efficiency efforts to handle soaring crude oil 
prices, and declining demand after the 9/11 terror attack. Since 2010 the airlines have 
had a positive net profit even though crude oil prices have been at all time high.  
 
Year
% of 
Operating 
Costs
Average 
Price per 
Barrel of 
Crude
Break-even 
Price per 
Barrel
Total Fuel 
Cost
2003 14% $28.8 $23.4 $44 billion
2004 17% $38.3 $34.5 $65 billion
2005 22% $54.5 $51.8 $91 billion
2006 26% $65.1 $68.3 $117 billion
2007 28% $73.0 $82.2 $135 billion
2008 33% $99.0 $88.9 $189 billion
2009 26% $62.0 $55.4 $125 billion
2010 26% $79.4 $91.0 $139 billion
2011F 30% $112.0 $116.3 $178 billion
2012F 32% $99.0 $101.1 $198 billion
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Figure	  1:	  Net	  profit	  and	  total	  industry	  fuel	  cost	  
Source:	  (IATA,	  Industry	  Stats,	  2011)	  	  It	   is	   normal	   to	   hedge	   the	   fuel	   costs.	   Fuel	   hedging	   is	   “the	   practice	   of	   making	  advance	  purchases	  of	   fuel	  at	  a	   fixed	  price	   for	   future	  delivery	   to	  protect	  against	  shock	   of	   anticipated	   rises	   in	   price”	   (Travel-­‐Industry-­‐Dictionary).	   The	   major	  airlines	   have	   been	   hedging	   since	   the	   1980s,	   but	   as	   the	   financial	   difficulties	  starting	  in	  2001	  developed,	  some	  of	  them	  no	  longer	  have	  cash	  available	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  oil-­‐futures	  market.	  One	  challenge	  that	  all	  firms	  have	  is	  to	  maintain	  energy	  cost	  control	  when	  crude	  oil	  price	  are	  volatile.	  Andy	  Harrison,	  chief	  executive	  of	  Easy	   Jet,	   pronounce	   the	   importance	   of	   crude	   oil	   for	   the	   airline	   industry:	   “Oil	  remains	  the	  biggest	  challenge	  and	  uncertainty”	  (Daily	  Mail,	  2008).	  	  
 
1.7	  Industry	  history	  
Since the airlines introduction to commercial use in the 1950, there has been a change 
on a technical level and in industry factors. One important industrial factor is the 
deregulation, which started in the United States in 1978, later followed into Europe 
and which is happening now in Asia. The deregulation or “liberalization” affected the 
competitive environment in the different regions. It lowered the entry barriers and the 
competition in the deregulated regions accelerated. This introduced the need of cost 
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efficiency and operating profitability management, and could be seen as the start of 
low-cost-carriers.  
   
The airline industry depends on good economic conditions both regional and 
worldwide to produce years with high growth and profitability. The deregulation has 
increased the competition and affected growth and profitability. This could be seen in 
figure 2 where the net profit has been very volatile since the 1990s. The airlines 
dependence of the world’s stability and economy can be seen in the period 1990 to 
1993 when the Gulf War hit the economy. After that the airline industry made record 
profitability for some years, before it once again was hit by a downturn in the 
economy. The financial crisis, which started in 2007, ended up forcing record losses 
for the airline industry. In this period the 9/11-terror attack also had a negative impact 
on profitability. This is not only caused by the public becoming more afraid to use air 
transportation, but also that new safety actions led to a much higher hassle factor of 
flying (MIT Global Airline Industry Program).  
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Figure	  2:	  Net	  profit	  in	  the	  airline	  industry 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (MIT Global Airline Industry Program) 
 
The increasing competition forced airlines to seek lower costs and higher 
productivity. This caused a high number of mergers, acquisitions and internal growth 
to take advantage of economies of scale. Economies of scale are “the increase in 
efficiency of production as the number of goods being produced increases. Typically, 
a company that achieves economies of scale lowers the average cost per unit through 
increased production since fixed costs are shared over an increased number of goods” 
(Investopedia, Economies Of Scale).  
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The governments became concerned about the industry’s consolidation and declining 
competition. Naturally, mergers are likely to face opposition from the government. As 
a consequence of this, airlines started to go into partnerships and “global strategic 
alliances” to acquire economies of scale. A strategic alliance is an arrangement 
between two companies that have decided to share resources to undertake a specific, 
mutually beneficial project. This alliance is less involved and less permanent than a 
joint venture, in which two companies typically pool resources to create a separate 
business entity (Investopedia, Strategic Alliance).  
 
Since 2000 we have seen a growth in low-fare airlines, which could better satisfy the 
new demand for low cost travel. In this period we have also seen that operating costs 
as fuel have been increasing. The economic downturn and higher operating costs lead 
to massive layoffs and cutbacks in the industry. It became clear that most of the 
legacy airlines (legacy airlines meaning full-service carriers) had to high operational 
costs and to low productivity compared to the low-fare airlines. These challenges led 
many large airlines (US Airways, United, Delta and Northwest among others) into 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the period 2001 to 2005. Under the bankruptcy protection 
these airlines started re-structuring with lay-offs and cutting operational costs, closing 
in on the advantage of low-fare airlines as shown in figure 3.  
 
Figure	  3:	  ($/ASM)	  Labour	  cost	  and	  available	  seat	  miles.	  (ASM	  is	  equal	  to	  number	  of	  available	  seats	  
times	  the	  number	  of	  miles	  flown,	  and	  is	  used	  to	  measure	  seat	  supply	  among	  airlines) 
 
Source: (MIT Global Airline Industry Program) 
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In 2010 the airline industry had revenue of 547 billion US Dollars and 2681 million 
scheduled passengers. The operating profit was 21.7 billion US Dollars and a profit 
margin of 4 per cent, which gave a net profit of 15.8 billion US Dollars and for the 
first time positive in the last three years. IATA forecasts an average of 4.6 per cent 
yearly growth into 2015. Historically the average growth has been 5 per cent the last 
30 years.  But the future is not only bright after a little boost in 2010. “2011 will 
certainly be more challenging. Rising oils prices and new taxes are already increasing 
cost. The currency crisis continues to hold back Europe’s recovery”. Giovanni 
Bisignani, Director and CEO of IATA (IATA, Industry Stats, 2011).  
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2.	  Theoretical	  framework	  concerning	  capital	  structure	  
Capital structure of companies is a widely studied subject. Since Modigliani and 
Miller’s (M&M) article about the irrelevancy of capital structure in 1958, the capital 
structure problematic have evolved and become a popular subject of empirical testing. 
Several new theories have accrued, but none of them have been able to fully explain 
all capital structure decisions. We are in this part of the thesis going to briefly 
mention some different models concerning capital structure determination. 
2.1	  Capital	  Structure	  irrelevance:	  The	  Modigliani-­‐Miller	  (M&M)	  Model	  	  
M&M were the first to introduce a formal analysis of the capital structure irrelevance 
theorem in the famous study “The cost of capital, Corporation Finance, and the theory 
of investment” (Miller, Modigliani & Merton, 1958). M&M showed that leverage 
would not affect the total value of the firm in a perfect capital market. A perfect 
capital is recognized by:  
 
1. “Investors and firms can trade the same set of securities at competitive market 
prices equal to the present value of their future cash flows. 
2. There are no taxes, transaction costs, or issuance costs associated with security 
trading. 
3. A firm financing decision do not change the cash flows generated by its 
investments, nor do they reveal new information about them. Hence there is 
no information asymmetry and the expectations of risk and return are the same 
for everyone.” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007 s. 455) 
 
M&M Proposition I: “In a perfect capital market, the total value of a firm is equal to 
the market value of the total cash flows generated by its assets and is not affected by 
its choice of capital structure.” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007, s. 455)  
 
Modigliani and Miller established their argument by the Law of One Price, 
Arbitrage Possibilities and Homemade Leverage. 
 
Law of One Price: In a perfect capital market the total cash flow paid out to all of the 
firm’s security holders is equal to the total cash flow generated by the firm’s assets. 
Thus as long as the choice of securities does not change the cash flow generated by 
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the assets, the value of the firm is given by the cash flows of the assets and not the 
choice of securities. The consequence of this claim is that decisions about financing 
and investments become independent.  
 
Arbitrage possibilities. Modigliani and Miller (1958) used the proof of contradiction 
in Proposition I. If Proposition I does not hold investors could exploit arbitrage 
opportunities, by short selling overpriced stock and buying under-priced stock with 
identical income streams. Since there are no transaction costs and the stocks are the 
same except for price, the investor would instantaneous increase their wealth. (Baker 
& Martin, 2011) 
 
Homemade leverage. If investors prefer an alternative capital structure to the one 
that the firm has chosen, he could borrow and lend on his own to achieve the 
preferable leverage level. This is possible because as long as investors can borrow or 
lend at the same rate as the firm and there is no transaction cost, which are two of the 
stated assumptions. Then homemade leverage becomes a perfect substitute for the use 
of leverage for the firm.  
 
MM Proposition II: “The cost of capital of levered equity increases with the firm’s 
market value debt-equity ratio.” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007, s. 461) 
 
Proposition II is an implication of M&M theory and proposition I. It states that the 
expected rate of return on the common stock of a levered firm increases in proportion 
to the debt-equity ratio, expressed in market values. Debt issues have an explicit and 
implicit cost. The explicit cost is the rate of interest charged on the firm’s debt. The 
implicit cost is that it increases the firm’s financial risk and therefore causes 
shareholders to demand a higher return on their investment. The implicit and explicit 
cost together makes that debt is no cheaper than equity, and the return that the 
investors require on their investment is unaffected by the firms capital structure. 
(Brealy, Myers, & Marcus, 2007) 
 
Equation	  1:	  Cost	  of	  capital	   !! = !! + !! ∗ !! − !! 	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Equation 1 reveals the effect of leverage on the return of the levered equity. The 
levered equity return equals unlevered return, plus some additional caused by 
leverage.  
 
The insight from M&M can be used to understand the firm’s cost of capital on new 
investments when they are levered. A levered firm is financed with both equity and 
debt; the risk of the underlying assets will match the risk of a portfolio of its equity 
and debt. Therefore the appropriate cost capital of this portfolio is the appropriate cost 
of capital for the firm’s assets. This gives us the weighted average of the firm’s equity 
and debt cost of capital.  
 
Equation	  2:	  Unlevered	  cost	  of	  capital	  (pre-­‐tax	  WACC)	  !! = !! + ! ∗ !! + !! + ! ∗ !! !ℎ!"!;	  !! =   !"#!$%!&  !"#!  !"  !"#$!%  !"  !"#$%&	  !! = !"#!$%!&  !"#$!%  !"  !"#$	  !! =   !"#!$%!&  !"#$!%  !"  !""#$  	  ! = !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"#$%&	  ! = !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&  	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Figure	  4:	  Cost	  of	  capital	  
 
(Source: (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007)) 
 
2.2	  Agency	  costs	  theories	  
The agency cost theory view on capital structure decisions has its origin from the 
principal-agent theories. Shareholders are defined as the principal, which because of 
time limitations etc. need to hire an agent (the managers of the company) to govern 
the company in their best interest. Hence, maximize shareholder value. In a non-
perfect world, there exist information asymmetries, which imply that the principal 
cannot control all the decisions made by the management. The main idea behind this 
capital structure theory is that the shareholders choose a level of leverage in order to 
discipline the company management (Jensen 1986), and by doing this, save a lot of 
time consuming efforts and monitoring costs. By using debt as a disciplinary factor, 
stakeholders may also have better control on the strategy, which the company 
management choose to follow. For example, by choosing a high level of leverage 
(high dividend pay out ratio, debt level etc.) shareholders decrease the probability of 
agents investing in unprofitable diversification projects just for personal reasons like 
status etc. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) find that diversified firms carry relatively 
more debt than non-diversified firms. This finding may be explained with the agency 
cost theory. The theory suggests that shareholders do not want more diversification 
and therefore increase their company’s debt level. Hence, they decrease the FCFF 
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available to self-interested managers (Jensen 1986) to invest in the (potentially) 
unprofitable diversification projects.  
 
2.3	  Trade-­‐off	  theory	  
In most countries interest cost, in contrast to dividends, is deducted from the 
companies’ taxable income. Hence, given that there are no cost related to high debt 
levels and borrowing rates are constant, it would increase company value when debt 
levels increase. Miller (1988) exclaims, “ The optimal capital structure might be all 
debt!” The trade-off theory includes the cost financial distress, and argues that debt 
levels are given by a trade-off between the present value of tax shield implied by debt 
financing and the its bankruptcy costs.  
 
Bankruptcy costs are either direct or indirect. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide a 
further analysis of these costs. Direct costs consist of legal, consulting and 
restructuring expenses when a company experience financial distress. The indirect 
costs are argued to include; lost sales and profits, broken contracts, poor credit terms, 
increased costs of issuing debt to refinance current obligations and employee 
turnover.  
 
The trade-off theory may be expressed analytically through the following model. Lets 
assume that a company generate a cash flow R that is uniformly distributed between 0 
and R*. D illustrates the company’s interest costs and T is the corresponding tax rate 
(assumed to be constant). If the companies generate R<D there is a deadweight loss of 
k*R that is used up in the process. (k is a constant) 
 
If R>D equity holders receive (R-D)(1-T), while if R<D they receive 0. The market 
value of debt equals !!!! ! + !! !(!!!)!  where !!!!  is the probability that R>D and !!  is 
the probability of default. The market value of equity is given as !!!! (!!!! − !)(1−!). The firms value, given by !! + !! equals: 
	  
Equation	  3:	  Firm	  value	  given	  by	  the	  sum	  of	  V(E)	  and	  V(D) = ! − !! ! + !2 − ! 1− ! + ! − !! ! + !! !(1− !)2  
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The model assume that the choice of leverage is determined by which D that 
maximize the company value. When deriving Eq.3 with respect on D, we get the 
following first order condition (FOB) (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006) (Lemmon & 
Zender, 2010):  
 
Equation	  4:	  FOB	  (marginal	  changes	  in	  firm	  value	  given	  changes	  in	  the	  firm's	  debt	  levels) !"!" = 0 → ! = !!! + 1− ! 
 
The model is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure	  5:	  Trade-­‐off	  theory	  
 
(Source: Johnsen 2010) 
 
 
The model imply that companies operating in industries or countries with high tax 
rates will have, ceteris paribus, a greater optimal leverage than equal companies 
operating with lower tax rates.  
 
When k increases, which implies lower expected bankruptcy costs, the optimal debt 
level decreases. This imply that it would be optimal for companies with a high portion 
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tangible assets which may easy be sold in the second hand market, to hold more debt 
than companies holding lots of intangible assets. 
 
As given by the FOC, the model also implies that there is a positive relationship 
between average free cash flow (profitability) and leverage. Hence, expected 
bankruptcy costs are lower (since the buffer kR is larger) and interest tax shields are 
more valuable for profitable companies. 
 
2.4	  Pecking	  Order	  
Pecking order don’t give us a well-defined target debt-to-value ratio but ranks the 
different financing options, and could therefore been seen as a contrast to the trade-off 
theory. Myers (1984) main points are that firms prefer internal finance. If internal 
funding is not enough, the firm will issue the safest security first. They will start with 
debt, then hybrid securities and equity as a last resort. Hybrid security could be for 
example convertible bonds. 
 
In the pecking order, there is no well-defined target debt-equity mix, because there are 
two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one 
at the bottom. Each firms observed debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirements for 
external finance. 
 
Myers argued that the pecking order theory was description of typical behaviour by 
looking at the aggregates from non-financial corporations over the decade 1973-1982. 
This showed that 62 per cent of the capital expenditure was financed with internally 
generated cash. The bulk of external financing came from borrowing and while net 
new stock issues only stand for 6 per cent.   
 
Myers (1984) set up an example with asymmetric information. A firm needs to raise 
N dollars to be able to invest in a potentially valuable investment opportunity. The net 
present value of this opportunity is y and x is the value of the firm without the 
investment.  
 
The manager of the firm knows what y and x is, but the investors in the capital market 
do not. Investors only see a joint distribution of possible values (x, y∼). So there is 
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asymmetry in information between the manager and investors. Information 
asymmetry is a situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior 
information compared to another. There is also a possible cost since the firm may 
have to sell securities for less than they are really worth. Myers supposes that issues 
stock with the aggregate value N when issued. But if investors would acquire 
manager’s information the value would be N1. 
 
Myers builds on that a manager’s objective is to maximize the intrinsic value of the 
firms existing shares, which would say the value of the old shareholders stakes in the 
firm. Possible new investors knows this and would therefore assume that the 
managers are not on their side, and will rationally adjust what they are willing to pay 
for the shares.  
 
Further Myers defines ΔN (ΔN= N1 – N) as the amount that the share is over- or 
undervalued. Then the manager will issue and invest when y > ΔN. This could lead to 
underinvestment as the firm could pass on a positive net present value opportunity 
since the share is undervalued.  
 
If the shares is overvalued managers would issue, even if is to only put the money in 
the bank. The problem with this is that the investors know this and would therefore 
only buy equity if the firm has already exhausted its debt capacity. This way investors 
force the managers to follow the pecking order. But as Myers later point out that this 
to extreme and the model is used to predict managers financing decision when there is 
asymmetric information. 
 
When the management acts this way its signals news to both old and new 
shareholders by their choice of financing. Myers list two key points from the 
assumptions and implications of the model above. 
 
1. The cost of relying on external financing. Asymmetric information creates a 
possibility that the firm would choose not to issue and therefore lose positive net 
present value investment. This underinvestment could be avoided if the firm has 
enough internal generated cash. 
 
	   25	  
2. The advantages of debt over equity issues. If the firm needs external funds, it is 
better of issuing debt than equity securities. This gives the general rule “Issue safe 
securities before risky ones”.  
 
It is worth mentioning that if the firm could issue default-risk free debt it would be as 
good as internally generated cash. Then ΔN is zero and the firm would never pass on 
a positive net present value investment opportunity.   
 
2.5	  Determinants	  of	  capital	  structure	  
 
Table	  2:	  Summary	  of	  predicted	  signs	  according	  to	  capital	  structure	  theories.	  
 
 
2.5.1	  Firm	  size	  
The effect of firm size is one of the most recognized determinants in studies of capital 
structure behaviour. Titman and Wessel (1988) claim that firm size functions as a 
natural diversification mechanism of company earnings, hence reducing the 
probability of default. Large companies should therefore bear more debt (and pay less 
to debt holders) than for example smaller firms. Trade-off theory argues that there 
exist a positive relationship between probability of default and leverage.  
 
Firm size may also function as proxy of transparency (asymmetric information). 
When you assume that large companies are subject of analysis by potential and 
existing investors more often than smaller companies. Hence, large firms are more 
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able to issue information sensitive equity than small firms. This implies that we could 
expect a negative relationship between firm size and debt according to pecking order, 
since larger firm exhibits increasing preference for equity relative to debt (Frank and 
Goyal 2009).  
 
Previous Empirical findings: 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated capital structure variables in G-7 countries. 
(G-7 is France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States). They 
used book leverage as dependent variable. In their sample size is positively correlated 
with leverage in all countries except Germany, where it is negative. They believe that 
the negative relationship is caused by German bankruptcy laws that offer better 
protection to creditors than the rest of the world, and not by asymmetric information. 
  
Mjos (2007) studied Norwegian companies in the period 1992-2005 and used several 
different measurements of leverage; the one we will focus on is interest bearing debt 
too total assets. In the variable for size, measured by ln total assets, they found a 
significant positive relationship. 
 
Titman and Wessel (1988) studied capital structure over the period 1974 to 1982. 
They found that size is negatively related to long-term debt divided by book value of 
assets but not long-term debt divided by market value of equity.  
 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) investigated the capital structure determinants for 
small and medium size firms in Greek, France, Italy and Portugal. When computing 
leverage (dependent variable) they does not differentiate between long-term and 
short-term debt, where we only use long-term debt. They computed firm size by the 
logarithm of sales and found a positive significant relationship between size and 
leverage. 
 
Gaud, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) investigated the capital structure in 106 Swiss 
companies that are listed in the Swiss stock exchange in the period 1991 to 2000. In 
their sample they found a positive correlation between size and leverage, when they 
computed size as the natural logarithm of sales. They concluded that this positive 
correlation is because size acts as an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy, 
which is consistent with the trade-off theory. They rejected that size acts as an inverse 
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proxy for informational asymmetries that are suggested from pecking order theory.  
 
Frank and Goyal (2007) studied the variation in market leverage across firms using a 
sample of publicly traded US firms from 1950 to 2003. They found what they call six 
core factors that account for more than 27 % of the variation in leverage. They found 
that large firms in terms of assets tend to have higher leverage.  
 
2.5.2	  Tangibility	  of	  assets	  
Tangible assets are that have a physical form (airplanes, buildings etc.). We have 
chosen to measure the factor by taking fixed assets-to-total assets. Tangible assets can 
be seen as the most secure assets that creditors can accept as security for the issued 
debt. It is the collateral the firm can offer to its debtors. Debtors are given the security 
since they can liquidate the assets in a case of bankruptcy. Tangible assets are easiest 
to value and liquidate compared to for example intangibles, since there are less 
asymmetric information and more a common revision standards for tangible assets.  
 
A high ratio of fixed-to-total assets leaves large collateral for the debtors and should 
therefore indicate lower risky debt and lower interest payments. But the influence of 
assets-to-total assets is not unambiguous.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue for a positive relationship between a high-ratio of 
fixed-to-total assets and leverage. They use the classical shareholder versus 
bondholder conflict, where the stockholders are prone to overinvest. However, since 
tangible assets can be secured against the debt, the creditors have a higher probability 
to recover their debt payments. This leads to lower agency costs and lower expected 
costs of distress (trade-off theory). This gives an expected positive relationship 
between size of tangible assets and debt.  
 
On the other side, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue for a negative relationship 
between tangibility of assets and leverage using agency costs and pecking order 
theory. Firms with lower levels of collateral (tangible assets) have higher agency costs 
for managers consuming excessive perquisites than firms with higher levels of 
collaterals. Firms with high levels of debt will be more closely monitored, and this 
reduces the excessive use of perquisites from managers. Since the monitoring costs in 
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general are higher for firms with less collateral, they might decide to have a higher 
level of debt for reducing the consumption of perquisites. The pecking order implies 
therefore a negative relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage.  
 
Previous empirical findings: 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that with cross-sectional relationship from 
international data that tangibility is positively correlated with leverage. But the 
relationship is not significant and is highly autocorrelated.  
 
Gaud, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) measured this variable as the sum of tangible assets 
and inventories divided by total assets. They explained the found positive relationship 
between leverage and tangibility, with firms use tangible assets as collateral when 
issuing debt. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2007) found that firms with more tangible assets tend to have 
higher leverage. This is further supported by Mjos (2007) study of Norwegian 
companies tangibility had a positive significant relationship with leverage. 
 
On the other side Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) measured asset tangibility as tangible 
assets divided by total assets. In their sample asset tangibility is negatively significant 
with leverage in all countries except Portugal. 
 
2.5.3	  Profitability	  
Profitability is a recognised determinant of capital structure decisions in firms and is 
essential in many of the different theories. From the trade-off theory, high 
profitability reduces probability of financial distress (or bankruptcy costs) and induces 
firms to increase debt levels because the tax-deductibility of interest payments. 
Hence; trade-off theory implies that there exist a positive relationship between 
leverage and profitability (Frank and Goyal, 2009) Agency theories expect the same 
positive relationship between profitability and size. Intuitively, high profitability 
increases the amount of funds available for managers to invest in new potential 
unprofitable investments. High leverage will discipline managers by forcing them to 
pay out more of the company’s excess cash (Jensen, 1986).  
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Pecking order theories imply in contrast to the theories mentioned above a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. Since retained cash is the cheapest 
way of raising funds for new investments because of information asymmetries, high 
profitability increases this amount and decreases the need of issuing debt (Myers, 
1984). 
 
Previous	  empirical	  findings:	  
In Titman and Wessels (1988) empirical findings profitability are negatively related to 
debt for both market and book values. But they are only significant for market values 
and not book values of debt ratios. They suggest that increase in market value because 
of increasing operating income, is not completely offset by increasing debt borrowing. 
This is consistent with Myers pecking order theory, that firms prefer internal to 
external financing.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that profitability is negatively correlated in all 
countries except Germany. This is supported by Mjos (2007) that found that there is a 
significant negative relationship between rentability and leverage.  
 
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) researched profitability by taking operating surplus 
and divide with total assets. Their sample shows that profitability is negatively 
correlated to leverage. Frank and Goyal (2007) also concluded that firms with higher 
profits tend to have lower leverage. 
 
Gaud, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) also found a negative relationship between debt and 
profitability, where profitability was measured by the return on total assets (the ratio 
of EBIT to total assets). They concluded as evidence for the pecking order theory and 
the trade-off theory in the short run. 
 
2.5.4	  Risk	  
High uncertainty of future cash flows increase the probability of financial distress, 
and make potential tax savings from using debt less predicable. The need of 
disciplinary actions towards the firm´s managers is also unsecure because of the 
unknown amount of retained earnings available for unprofitable investments. Hence, 
trade-off theory and agency theory draw towards a negative relationship between the 
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level of earnings volatility and leverage. (Frank and Goyal, 2009) On the other side 
firms with high business risk may have lower agency cost of debt, and therefore could 
borrow more. Hence, we can use the agency theory to explain both positive and 
negative signs. 
 
Earnings volatility can be argued to have the same negative relationship when 
following the pecking order theory. Intuitively, a reputation of highly volatile 
earnings may induce lenders to demand an additional risk premium on debt (higher 
cost of debt), which reduces the motivation of choosing debt when raising new capital 
(Baker & Martin, 2011). 
 
Previous	  empirical	  findings:	  
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) computed risk as the squared deviation of each year’s 
earnings before tax. They found that leverage is negatively correlated with risk. This 
is equal to the relationship found in Frank & Goyal (2007). 
 
On the other side Kim and Sorensen (1986) used variation in EBIT as a proxy for 
business risk, and found it to be positive and significant. They concluded that it 
supported the argument that operating variance may reduce the agency cost of debt, 
rather than increase it. 
 
2.5.5	  Growth	  opportunities	  
Growth opportunities can be measured using the market-to-book ratio (M/B), the 
change in logarithm of total assets or the ratio of capital expenditures to assets and the 
percentage change in total sales. We have chosen the percentage change in total sales 
as a proxy of growth opportunities in our regression model since this avoids us having 
market value stated in both the independent and dependent variable. We will include 
the M/B ratio in our descriptive statics because it is intuitively easy to interpret and 
compare. 
 
The pecking order in its simplest form predicts a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. Since firms need to take up debt when investments 
exceeds retained earnings. Therefore leverage would increase when investments 
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exceeds retained earnings and decrease when investments is less than retained 
earnings.  
 
However, using the pecking order theory with taken the future of the firm more in 
account. Managers would look into the future and keep a low level of debt, since they 
will avoid using new equity offerings to finance new investments. Equity offerings 
are lowest in the pecking order and could signal that the stock is overpriced. This 
leads to a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009)  
 
“The trade-off theory predicts that firms predicts firms with more investments 
opportunities have less leverage because they have stronger incentives to avoid 
underinvestment and asset substitution that can arise from stockholder-bondholder 
agency conflicts” (Frank and Goyal, 2011, page 25). This is supported by Myers 
(1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), which argue that managers of highly levered 
firms have stronger incentives to engage in underinvestment and asset substitution.	  	  
	  
Previous	  empirical	  findings:	  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) measured growth with market to book, which enters with a 
negative coefficient in all countries except Italy, and has a high degree of 
autocorrelation. 
 
Gaud, Hoesli, and Bender (2005) found that growth firms are less levered than the 
non-growth firms, which they conclude is caused by that growth firms prefer equity to 
debt to avoid bankruptcy in accordance with pecking order theory. Gaud measured 
growth as the market-to-book value. Also Frank and Goyal (2007) measured growth 
by taking market-to-book assets ratio, where they found a negative relationship 
between growth and leverage. 
 
2.5.6	  Energy	  intensity	  
High levels of energy related cost compared other costs may increase the probability 
of becoming insolvent; hence, cost of debt will increase (Shivdasani & Zenner, 2005). 
Energy prices (here, fuel prices) have become more expensive and volatile during the 
period 2000-2010. This increases the importance of hedging and more fuel-efficient 
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airplanes. Volatile fuel costs that is a major part of the companies overall costs imply 
a lower degree of leverage when using the trade-off theory. This negative relationship 
is caused by increased probability of default and a more uncertain potential tax 
saving. Agency theory will induce the same relationship. Higher uncertainty of future 
fuel costs decreases the need of disciplinary actions because the amount of retained 
earnings available for unprofitable investments is unknown.  
 
High degree of fuel costs may increase company risk, and therefore result in that 
debtors will demand an additional risk premium when lending funds to the company. 
Hence, debt becomes more expensive and managers get incentives to reduce the 
probability of needing to lend money. Pecking order theory argues that we would 
expect a negative relationship between energy intensity and leverage.  
 
2.5.7	  Ownership	  structure	  
Ownership structure states whether the company is a public or state owned firm.  
There are studies that indicate that there is a relationship between ownership 
concentration and capital structure. Diffield, Mahambare and Pal (2007) find a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and leverage in Indonesian and 
Korean firms. One may intuitively argue that high ownership concentration 
(especially if the major owner is the government) firms are perceived to be more 
robust (lower probability of financial distress), and that they therefor get a lower 
premium when borrowing funds. There are also found a positive relationship between 
financial performance and ownership concentration (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), 
which again imply that these firms, from the trade-off theory, may have a higher 
potential tax benefit from increasing their debt levels. Pecking order theory would 
imply a lower degree of leverage because of the high level of retained earnings. (NB! 
High concentration ownership is not equivalent with governmentally owned 
companies, but do we find the same relationship?) 
 
2.5.8	  Debt	  rating	  
The pecking order theory predicts that firms with credit rating will use less debt and 
more equity, hence a negative relationship between leverage and credit rating. On the 
other side firms with credit rating would face a lower degree of information 
asymmetry and therefore use more equity and less debt. Because you will expect 
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firms with credit rating have easier access to the debt market and hence a higher 
leverage on the side. This is suggested and researched by Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006) and Lemmon and Zender (2010).  
 
To support debt rating as a determining factor for leverage Kisgen (2009) have 
documented that firms issue significantly less debt when they are close to rating 
changes.  
 
2.5.9	  Capital	  structure	  and	  degree	  of	  competition	  
Degree of competition is one of the industry specific factors mentioned in the section 
above. There are conducted several tests on whether and how increasing competition 
affect the firms choice of capital structure. Opler and Titman (1994) suggest that 
highly levered firms lose market share to their less levered rivals during industry 
downturns for several reasons. First, distressed firms that face underinvestment 
problems (debt overhang) are forced to sell off assets and reduce their selling efforts. 
Second, highly levered firms have difficulty retaining and attracting customers who 
are concerned abut long-term viability and product quality of product. Third, rival 
competitors can consider highly levered firms as a vulnerable competitor and seize 
the opportunity to steal customers.  
 
Low-levered firms, assumed to have deep pockets, can engage in predatory practices 
especially in a highly competitive environment designed to financially exhaust highly 
levered rivals and drive them out of the market. A highly levered firm might be 
vulnerable to predation from low-levered competitors because low-levered 
competitors can purposefully reduce their prices and keep this strategy for a long time 
to drive the highly levered firm out of business. The highly levered firm may not 
survive this kind of competitive behaviour if it can no longer secure financing for its 
operating or investment costs. (Baker & Martin, 2011) 
 
High level of competition can replace debt as a managerial disciplinary mechanism, 
thereby inducing more efficient behaviour.  
 
The airline industry has internationally experienced a shift in the degree of 
competition. From being an initially regulated industry, it as now become deregulated 
	   34	  
and much more competitive. The deregulation has introduced new low-cost players 
into the market. We expect that low-cost firms (which compete on prices) bear less 
debt than airline companies that follow the full-service business model. 
 
2.5.10	  Leasing	  
“A lease is a contract that allows the lessor to retain ownership of an asset and that the 
lessee to enjoy the services of the asset over a stipulated time period in return for 
stipulated rental payments to the lessor” (Baker and Martin, 2011 page 387).  
In a lease the lessor takes the risks and returns from the ownership of the asset while 
the lessee takes the risks and returns from the use of the asset. The primary element of 
risk in ownership comes from the risk of default by the lessee, and the liquidation 
value plays an important role if default. These are two of the main elements in the 
cost of leasing.  
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board distinguishes between two type of leases based 
on the lease terms and the classification determines the accounting treatment of the 
lease: 
• Operational lease: The entire lease payments are reported as operating 
expense, but are not reported as asset or the lease payments as liability in the 
balance sheet. 
• Capital lease: Listed as acquired asset and the future lease payments as 
liability on the balance sheet. The interest payments are deducted as an interest 
expense. 
The different accounting type of lease will affect the firm’s balance sheet as well as 
the debt-equity ratio. 
 
PV (Lease payments) = Purchase Price – PV (Residual Value)  
In a perfect market, the cost of leasing is equivalent to the cost of purchasing and 
reselling the asset. Residual value is the assets market value at the end of the lease.  
 
Assuming that the loan is fairly priced, the loan payments would be                                     
PV (loan Payments) = Purchase Price 
Considering residual value, the Law of One Price and the total cost of purchasing 
either the loan or the lease is the same we get 
	   35	  
 
PV (Lease Payments) + PV (Residual Value) = PV (Loan Payments) 
In a perfect market the cost of leasing and then purchasing the asset is equivalent to 
the cost of borrowing to purchase the asset. Leasing is just another zero-NPV 
financing alternative for firms in a perfect capital market. 
 
To compare the decision to lease versus borrowing, you must determine the amount 
of loan that leads to same level of fixed obligations that the firm would have with the 
lease. This is called the lease-equivalent loan. The lease-equivalent loan is the loan 
that is required on the purchased asset that leaves the purchaser with the same 
obligations, as the lessee would have. Then you are avoiding too ignore the important 
point that the lease obligation could trigger financial distress. Hence the firm is 
effectively adding leverage to its capital structure, even though it is not stated on the 
balance sheet (operational lease). (Berk & DeMarzo 2007) 
 
Previous	  empirical	  findings:	  
Gavazza (2011) examined the commercial aircraft leasing market with the intuition 
that more liquid assets decrease the cost of external financing, this making leasing 
more attractive. This is caused by that more liquid assets are more redeploy able and 
less specific, which you find in aircrafts. Since more than half of the commercial 
aircrafts are leased and there exists an active secondary market, which as mentioned 
makes aircrafts liquid assets. One of Gavazza’s findings was that more liquid the 
aircraft was the more likely to be leased, and to be an operational lease.  
 
The second market plays an allocative role since airlines trade aircrafts to adjust their 
productive capacity. When there is a positive demand shock affecting profitability 
airlines expand and acquire aircrafts, and conversely negative shock they sell 
aircrafts. This way leasing helps to efficiently locate the capital goods. Leasing allows 
also carriers to transfer some risk to the operating lessors. The lessors are assumed to 
take the aircraft ownership risk through their economies of scale, knowledge, 
diversification of aircrafts and geographic regions.   
 
Gavazza (2010) found that high-volatility airlines lease and low-volatility airlines 
own aircrafts. This is caused by high-volatility airlines expect to adjust their capacity 
more frequently and therefore value leasing more than low-volatility airlines.  His 
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empirical analysis shows that leased aircrafts are parked inactive less frequently than 
owned aircrafts, and when under the condition of being used leased aircrafts have a 
higher capacity utilization than the owned aircrafts. 
 
2.5.11	  Capital	  structure	  and	  industry	  effects	  
Firm specific and industry characteristics are thought to have important implications 
on the choice of capital structure. Industry characteristics may consist of for example 
the competitive nature of the industry, level of technology and need of continuing 
innovation (tech industries), barriers of entry, excess to close substitutes, regulations 
etc. Industry characteristics are tested in several different empirical studies. Sanyal 
and Mann (2010) find that the financial structure of non-high-tech and high-tech start 
up companies differ significantly. Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) show how 
companies alter their capital structure in order to gain a better competitive position in 
the product market. Since the airline industry has strong characteristics, and these 
characteristics are shown to have significantly effects on capital structure. We expect 
to find our estimated coefficients to differ from the ones obtained in similar empirical 
tests conducted on other industries.  
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Table	  3:	  Summary	  of	  previous	  empirical	  finding	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3.	  Methodology	  and	  empirical	  data	  
 
3.1	  Data	  sample	  
The collected data sample is the foundation of our study and we have therefore 
assigned a brief discussion about how we found the data and how we choose which 
companies to include. 
 
To collect data for this thesis we have used the companies’ annual reports, the three 
major rating agency’s web pages and the database Datastream. We have chosen 
Datastream since it consists of comprehensive time series data that have both the 
depth and range to give us all the information needed to perform our planned analysis. 
Datastream could give us data from a span of 50 years from 175 countries and 60 
global markets. The school have this program installed on some of their computers 
and we used the excel application to create a spreadsheet for later input in STATA. 
 
Financial information as EBIT, Sales, etc. was found searching the companies’ annual 
reports. These reports are found online, either as a link in the companies’ official web 
page, or in sites that are specialized in publishing annual reports. Market values of 
equity are collected using the Datastream application, while credit ratings are found 
by searching in the three major rating agencies’ web pages. Information about 
ownership structure and strategy (low-cost vs. service) are found in the annual 
reports. 
 
Our sample’s company information is collected for the time span 2000 to 2010. For 
different reasons we have not been able to fully gather all company information in 
this time period. Possible explanations may be the presence of bankruptcies, mergers 
etc. happening between 2000 and 2010. This thesis is about which (if any) of our 
chosen explanatory variables that can be proven significantly to affect airline 
companies leverage. We believe that a ten-year period gives us a large enough span to 
produce an acceptable picture of our chosen companies’ economic fluctuations. Over 
the ten-year periods both the economy and the airline industry have had their ups- and 
downturns. Examples of downturns are the 11.09 happening, the SARS virus (BBC 
News, 2003) and the economic crisis. An up turn may be the pre-financial crisis years.  
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We have included all medium to large airline companies (mainly those that are a part 
of one of the large alliances) that have had their financial reports available online. 
There are large companies that could not be included, because of the lack of 
information (Examples are Qatar airways and other airlines from the middle east). 
Very small companies are not included since we mainly focus on companies that are 
traded in an exchange. Some airlines are governmentally owned and there are no 
available data on their market value. This would especially affect the leverage to 
market model (Model 2), since market values are a part of the dependent variables. 
 
3.1.1	  Criticism	  of	  data	  sample	  
Our sample size of 39 airlines could be argued to be small, especially with the lack of 
some variables for some airlines. This could make the result of our analysis less 
robust and we will therefore be careful when concluding. Hence, demanding a high 
level of significance, at least 5 per cent, when testing our estimated coefficients.  
 
The sample consists of airlines from 25 different countries, where US is most 
frequently represented with nine different airlines. The different countries and time 
period of ten years could create an accounting problem, since accounting practice and 
standards may be different from year to year and between countries. This can be a 
potential problem when conducting the analysis, because we may experience using 
variables that do not contain the same information. We have tried to normalize the 
data by looking in the notes of the annual reports and then put data together into our 
chosen variables, thereby making them contain equal information. One variable that 
are more subjective and would need an extra explanation and discussion is interest-
bearing debt. We have chosen to use interest bearing long-term debt, short-term part 
of long-term interest bearing debt, short-term financial leases and long-term financial 
leases. By doing these correcting measures, we believe to minimize the potential 
negative effects of difference in accounting etc.  
 
We have tried to focus on airlines that could give us data from the whole period 2000 
to 2010. This could result in a survival bias, since airlines that went bankrupt, merged 
or was acquisitioned would be avoided. The airline industry has frequently been a 
subject of mergers and acquisitions during the last decade, and we cannot leave out all 
the affected companies. Companies that have gone bankrupt have not been included. 
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Since we have not included airlines that have gone bankrupt over the period it is 
possible that we have an underestimation of the debt ratio in our dataset. Assumed 
that the companies that have gone bankrupt would in average have a higher debt ratio 
than the survivors. This problem is not easy to solve. On possibility is to include the 
companies that have been delisted because of bankruptcy. These companies may be 
difficult to include because of the lack of information. Their balance sheets may be 
private, and we would have to reconstruct the data from old financial statements. By 
doing this we may raise the possibility of diminishing the reliability of our research 
because of potential faults in the data. As a consequence, we choose not to include 
these “problem” companies in our sample. 
 
Airlines with a negative book value of equity have been changed to zero. Their 
negative book value of equity indicates that the airline is kept in business from 
extraneous reasons, like for example bankruptcy protection.  
 
The conclusion is that there will be some problems with our data sample that we are 
unable to handle. We will therefore have this in mind when performing our analysis. 
 
3.2	  Econometric	  analysis	  theory	  
Econometrics is based upon the development of statistical methods for estimating 
economic relationships, testing economic theories, and evaluating and implementing 
government and business policies (Wooldridge, 2009). We will use econometrics to 
analyse our data. Before conducting the analysis we want to present a rough summary 
of the econometric methods that we are planning to use, their limitations, and their 
critical assumptions. 
 
3.2.1	  Regular	  Ordinary	  Least	  Squared	  (OLS)	  
A common way of conducting econometric analysis is by using the OLS method. The 
method estimates model coefficients that minimize the squared sum of residuals (the 
error term). In order for the OLS estimates to be BLUE (best linear unbiased 
estimator) the Gauss Markov assumptions (1-5) has to be valid. Assumption 6 is very 
strong, and we may still use the information from the regression even if the normality 
assumption is invalid. Given a large sample size, the assumptions 1-5 will produce 
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asymptotic results. The Gauss Markov assumptions and normality assumption are 
stated briefly beneath:  
 
ASSUMPTIONS:  
1) Linear in parameters:  
2) Random sampling 
3) No perfect collinearity 
4) Zero conditional mean 
5) Homoscedasticity 
6) Normality    
 
Further information etc. about the diff. assumptions is found in the attachments 7.1. 
	  
3.2.1.1	  Dummy-­‐variables	  
In order to control for different qualitative information we introduce dummy 
variables. Dummy variables are given either the value 1 or 0 depending the chosen 
definition. By using dummy variables we are able to study how qualitative data affect 
the model interception or the estimated coefficients.  
	  
3.2.2	  Panel	  Data	  
When conducting an econometric analysis on panel data we measure the same units in 
at least two periods. Hence, we are able to study the sample in two diff. dimensions:  -­‐ A cross sectional dimension N -­‐ A time – series dimension T 
 
The advantages by using panel data are that we are able to increase our sample size, 
reduce potential multicollinearity problems, build dynamic models, and control for 
unobservable effects better than when using cross section or time series individually. 
The reduction of multicollinearity is a potential result from that there are variation 
between cross-sections and time, which then imply that that the eventual high degree 
of correlation between two or more independent variables in a cross sectional model 
is decreasing when using panel data.  
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A panel data OLS regression model is given by: !!" = !! + !!!"!!!" +⋯+ !!"#!!"# +!!" ,!"#ℎ  !!" = !! + !!"  where vit is called the composite error and contain a factor !!which pick up all unobserved individual specific effects that are constant over time, 
and the regular residuals uit which now vary through time.  
 
When using panel data there are, as with regular cross sectional data analysis, some 
assumptions that must be valid for the estimated coefficients to be of any interest. In 
our analysis we focus on two diff. methods. The assumptions of each method are 
mentioned in the attachments (7.2 or 7.3) 
 
When using fixed effects (FE), the goal is to eliminate the unobservable factor !! 
because it is perceived correlated with one or more of !!"# . If !"# !!" ,!! > 0, 
pooled OLS (i.e. ignoring the specific term) will provide a biased estimates of !!"#. 
Hence, the results are not BLUE and have no/little explanatory power. Lets assume 
that !!  is in fact uncorrelated with each explanatory variable in each period. Then, 
using transformation to eliminate !!  results in inefficient estimators since we loose a 
lot of information when removing !!. When !"## !! , !!"# = 0  and all the methods 
assumptions hold, it is more efficient to use the random effects (RE) analysis.  
 
FE or RE? 
Because FE allow !"# !!" ,!! > 0, while RE need !"# !!" ,!! = 0, FE is widely 
thought to be a more convincing tool for estimation of ceteris paribus effects. If key 
explanatory variables are constant through time (like for example dummy variables), 
we cannot use FE to estimate this effect. If key explanatory variables are non-
constant, we still prefer to us RE as long as !"# !!! ,!! = 0. 
 
Overall we can conclude that if: -­‐ !! = 0 → OLS is perfered -­‐ !! ≠ 0  !"#  !"# !! , !!"# = 0 → RE is preferred -­‐ !! ≠ 0  !"#  !"# !! , !!"# ≠ 0 → FE is preferred 
 
We will conduct both FE and RE in our underlying econometric analysis. We will 
then conduct a Hausman test in order to choose which of the methods to favour when 
presenting our results. The basic idea behind the Hausman test is to use RE estimates 
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unless the test reject H0. We will fail to reject when RE estimated ≈ FE estimates, or 
if !!! is large. 
 
3.3	  The	  regression	  model	  
We are mainly using three different regression methods. As mentioned above, OLS is 
the preferred test to perform regression model when the corresponding assumptions 
are valid, hence, the coefficients are BLUE and consistent. The model can be written 
as:  
 
Equation	  5:	  The	  regression	  model !!" = !! + !!"#$!"#$!" + !!"#$%&!"#$%&!" + !!"#$%!!"#$%ℎ!" + !!"#!"#!" +!!"#$!"#$!" + !!"#$"!"#$"%&'!"   +  !!"#$#%"$&  !"#$%&"!!"#$#%"$&  !"#$%&"ℎ!" +!!"#$"%&!"#$"%&!"   +  !!"#$%&'!"#$%&'!" + !!"#$%!"#$%!" + !    
 !ℎ!"!  ! = !"#$%&'%(%#")%  !"  !""!"#$#%&'#, ! = !"#$%&', ! = !"#$ 
 
If the OLS assumptions four and five are non-valid, we would choose to use a FE or 
RE regression method depending on the Hausman test and whether the assumptions 
mentioned in attachment 7.2 and 7.3 are valid. 
 
We are going to operate with two different models. Model 1 is given by the usage of a 
dependent variable of book-leverage, while Model 2 uses market-leverage as 
dependent variable. The two models have different benefits. Model 1 is based on 
accounting-based historic values, while Model 2’s explanatory variable is based on 
the expectations of future cash flows. In other words we can argue that Model 1 is 
backward looking, while Model 2 is forward looking. We cannot say that one of the 
explanatory variables is better than the other, and both have been used in empirical 
studies concerning the “what determines a company´s capital structure” problematic. 
Since we believe that there may be obtained interesting findings by using both 
models, this thesis will contain both of them. 
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3.4	  Definition	  of	  variables	  
We are in this part of the assignment going to clearly define the variables that we are 
going to use in our econometric analysis. 
 
3.4.1	  Dependent	  variables	  
Book-leverage 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"!"#$%$&'($! = !"#. !"#$.!"#$! !"#. !"#$.!"#$! + !"#$!  
 
The variable !"#$%$&#  !"#$%&'  !"#$! is equal to the one argued for in the paragraph 
above. It may be important to mention that we have defined long-term financial leases 
and short-term part of financial leases as interest bearing. Hence, they are included in 
the independent variable in both Model 1 and 2. !"#$! represents the value of equity 
found from the representative company’s accounting. 
 
Market-leverage 
This variable is defined as:  
 !"#$%&'%(%#")%! = !"#. !"#$.!"#$! !"#. !"#$.!"#$! +!"#$!  
 
The variable !"#$%$&#  !"#$%&'  !"#$!  is given by finding total liabilities for the 
representative company and subtracting the corresponding accounts payables, 
accounts receivables and other non-interest bearing debt. The reason behind removing 
these non-interest bearing accounting records is that they no longer may disrupt the 
“real” financial leverage, which is in line with the argumentation found in Rajan & 
Zingales (1995). !"#$!  represent the market value of the company’s equity. 
 
3.4.2	  Independent	  variables	  
Profit  
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$%&! = !"#$! !"#$%  !"#$%! 
	   45	  
 
The profit variable is meant to measure the overall profitability of the given company. 
From different studies we find that there are many different methods to calculate this 
variable. We have chosen to define this variable as (earnings before interest and 
taxes) EBIT’s part of total sales, which is equal to what is done in for example Frank 
and Goyal (2009). 
 
Collateralize value of assets (CVA) 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#! = !!"! !"!"#  !""#$"! 
 
CVA (a proxy of the firm’s tangibility of assets) is meant to measure the availability 
of the company’s assets. This variable is motivated by the argument that a company’s 
composition of assets may affect the financial leverage. It is important to mention that 
we use net values of property plant and equipment (PPE) where accumulated 
depreciation is subtracted from the acquisition value. Equal variable definition is 
found in Rajan et.al (1995), Frank et.al (2009). Titman and Wessels (1988) focus on 
the size of intangible assets compared to total assets, which is the opposite of what we 
are doing. 
 
Size 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$! = !"(!"#$%  !"#$%!) 
 
Size is meant to illustrate the magnitude of the representative company’s operations. 
This method of using ln of sales when calculating size is used in several other studies 
Frank et.al (2009), Rajan et al. (1995) and Titman & Wessels (1988). 
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Growth 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$%ℎ! = !"#$%  !"#$%! !"#$%  !"#$%!!! − 1 
 
The growth variable is found by calculating the percentage change in the company’s 
total sales. This way of defining growth can also be found in Frydenberg (2004). 
Another popular method to define this variable is to use the market-to-book 
relationship (also known as Tobin’s Q). We chose not to use Tobin’s Q as proxy of 
growth because we are uncertain which possible effects it will have on our regression 
to have the same data as a part of both an dependent variable and independent 
variable. We will use Tobin’s Q in the descriptive statistic analysis because it is easier 
to interpret and compare. 
 
Fuel 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$! = !"#$%"&! !"#$%  !"#$%! 
 
The fuel variable is meant to be a proxy of energy intensity. The jet fuel cost is found 
either in the general income statement or in the notes of operational expense. A 
possible pit fall with this variable definition is that successful hedging (and/or 
speculation) etc. may reduce the jet fuel cost and give us a more frail picture of the 
companies actual jet fuel consumption. On the other hand, we assume that none of the 
companies are better to hedge/speculate in price shifts and that the variable on 
average produces a good proxy of the companies’ energy demand. There are no 
studies as we know of that have used this variable definition. 
 
Leasing 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$%&'! = !"#$%&'()%*  !"#$%&'  !"#$%&$! !"#$%  !"#$!! 
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Leasing is meant to give us a picture of the representative company’s leasing policies. 
We focus on operational leasing costs because this is a way of leveraging the 
company without stating it in the accounted liabilities.  There are no studies as we 
know of that have used this variable definition. 
 
Financial Strength 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$#%"$&  !"#$%&"ℎ!" = !"#$%&!" − !"#$%&!!!!! ! ! ∗ −1   !"   !"#$%&! −!"#$%&!!!!! ! < 0   ,  
   !ℎ!"!  !"#$%&! = !"#$! !"#$%  !""#$"! 
 
The financial strength variable is meant to be a proxy of risk and is calculated by 
taking the square of the return of the company when the average return obtained by 
the whole sample for the studied time period is subtracted. This is also controlled for 
negative values. Its purpose is to represent the risk accompanying to the company’s 
earnings and the company’s bankruptcy costs. When a company produces a return 
below the average return, obtained from all companies during the whole sample 
period, we perceive it to be more risky than companies with positive financial 
strength variables. The variable uses EBIT/Total sales as a measure of obtained 
return. Similar variable definitions is also use by Booth et al. (2001) and Frydenberg 
(2004) 
 
Low-cost 
This dummy variable is defined as: 
 !"#$"%&! = 1  !"  !"#$"%&  !"#$"%&', !"#!  !"#$"%&! = 0   
 
We have added this binary variable in order to get qualitative information on whether 
there is a difference in the capital structure of companies that follow a low-cost or 
service business strategy. We found information on the companies strategy in their 
annual reports. 
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Rated 
This dummy variable is defined as: 
 !"#$%! = 1  !"  !ℎ!  !"#$%&'  !"  !"#$%, !"#!  !"#$%! = 0   
 
The binary variable Rated was created in order to acquire qualitative information on 
whether there is a difference in the capital structure of companies that are rated or 
non-rated by one of the three major rating agencies. This variable is meant to be a 
proxy of the company’s transparency.  
 
Private 
This variable is defined as: 
 !"#$%&'! = 1  !"  !"#$  !ℎ!"  50%  !"  !ℎ!  !"#$%&'  !"  !"#$%  !"  !"!− !"#$%&'$&()*  !"#$!$%$!&"#(!"  !"#!$"), !"#!  !"#$%&'! = 0   
 
This binary variable was made in order to be able to test whether there are differences 
between highly governmental owned and private companies when looking at their 
capital structure.  
 
3.5	  Hypothesis	  
Based on the theories mentioned in part 2 of our assignment and their implications on 
company´s financial leverage, we formulate three different hypotheses for the airline 
companies in our sample. The first hypothesis is formulated for the trade-off theory. 
The second hypothesis is for pecking order theory, while hypothesis three is for the 
agency theory. We will use the hypothesis to test whether one of the different theories 
are more relevant for the airline industry than the others. Hi is the alternative 
hypothesis while H0 is the null hypothesis. We will reject H0 based on the estimated 
coefficients’ 95 per cent confidence interval. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Trade-Off Theory 
H1.1 - CVA 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and CVA 
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H0: There is a negative/no relationship between leverage and CVA 
H1.2 - Size 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and size 
H0: There is a negative/no relationship between leverage and size 
H1.3 - Profit 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and profit 
H0: There is a negative/no relationship between leverage and profit 
H1.4 – Financial strength 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and the risk proxy  
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and the risk proxy  
H1.5 - Growth 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and growth 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and growth 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Pecking Order Theory 
H2.1 - CVA 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and CVA 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and CVA 
H2.2 - Size 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and size 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and size 
H2.3 - Profitability 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and profitability 
H2.4 – Financial strength 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
H2.5 - Growth 
Hi: There is a relationship between leverage and growth 
H0: There is no relationship between leverage and growth 
 
Hypothesis 3 – Agency Theory 
H3.1 - Profitability 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and profitability 
H0: There is a negative/no relationship between leverage and profitability 
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H3.2 – Financial strength 
Hi: There is a relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
H0: There is no relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
H3.3 - Growth 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and growth 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and growth 
 
Table	  4:	  Summary	  of	  alternative	  hypothesis 
 
 
4.	  Analysis	  and	  results	  
This section first describes the statistics concerning our data sample and later shows 
the analytical results from our econometric testing. 
 
4.1	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
Our data sample consists of 39 airline companies from different parts of the world. 
Annual report information is collected for the time period 1999(2000)-2010. The 
following table 4 demonstrates a summary of the descriptive statistics for variables 
and important factors in our analysis. Table 4 include variable mean, standard 
deviation and minimum/maximum values.  
 
!"#$%& '&"()*%++, -)#./01,%&()&, 21)0#3,#%4$
!"#$%&"'( 5 *
)*+ 5 *
,#-."/01"2"/3 5 * 5
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Table	  5:	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
 
 
4.1.1	  Book-­‐leverage	  
Our sample has a book-leverage mean of 0.548, which imply that the average airline 
company’s total assets are financed by 54.8 per cent debt. The high standard deviation 
and gap between minimum and maximum values indicate large variations. Frank and 
Goyal (2009) got average long-term debt to total assets of 20%, which indicates that 
companies in our sample on average use significantly more leverage than the average 
US non-financial company in the period 1950 – 2003.  
4.1.2	  Market-­‐leverage	  
Market-leverage is our forward-looking dependent variable for Model 2. In our 
sample the average market-leverage is 0,482, which imply that the average airline 
debt is 48.2% of their market value. With standard deviation of 0.24 and maximum 
0.97 and minimum of 0, indicates large variations in our sample. In comparison Frank 
and Goyal (2009) got an average market-leverage of 0.2 that is considerably lower.  
 
4.1.3	  Profit	  
The profit airline industry mean of 5.38% is high compared to the one´s found by 
Frank and Goyal (2009) (2%, but they use EBITDA/Sales) and Oftedal and Sorhus 
(2011) (-1%). The negative value obtained from Oftedal and Sorhus`s (2011) 
reference sample is argued in their thesis to be explained by the negative effects of the 
financial crisis. Hence, this may imply that the average airline company handled the 
negative effects of the financial crisis better than the general company.   
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # Observations
bookleverage .548453 .2421684 0 1 336
marketleverage .4816494 .2418083 0 .9696208 281
debt 2942.253 3413.325 0 17198 336
profit .0538167 .128189 -.4949507 .952381 358
cva .5706763 .1671552 .0546149 .9074107 341
size 8.03139 1.385772 3.091043 10.5007 358
market-to-book 1.792615 3.34475 -39.05 19.94416 318
fuel .2273109 .0857857 .0174567 .4868652 328
leasing .0666439 .0519218 0 .3301663 339
totalassets 8263.035 9238.904 6 45114.3 349
private1govern0 .4977169 .5005665 0 1 438
lowcost1service0 .537037 .6406159 0 2 324
rated1non-rated0 .3114754 .4636398 0 1 427
risk .0137014 .1989898 -.2777906 3.495543 349
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Another factor that may explain the difference between the profit ratios obtained in 
our sample and the one found by Oftedal and Sorhus (2011) is that we have chosen 
large well-known companies while their reference sample consist of large, medium 
and small companies. They mention that many of the small companies had large 
negative EBIT values during the period 2008-2009, while our sample may be affected 
by a degree of survival bias. This draws us to the possibility that our estimated 
profitability is artificially high.  
 
4.1.4	  CVA	  
CVA ranges form zero to one and our sample produce a value of 0.57, which 
indicates that on average 57 per cent of the airline´s assets are tangible. Compared to 
Frank and Goyal (2009) sample of US listed non-financial firms from the period 
1950-2003, which produce a ratio of 0.34 our result support the statement that the 
airline industry is generally more capital-intensive than the average company. Oftedal 
and Sorhus (2011) got a value of 0.513 on their reference sample (including listed 
companies from several different countries in the period 2006-2009), which also 
supports the statement of high capital intensity in the airline industry.  
 
4.1.5	  Size	  
Size is constructed as the logarithm of sales, hence the mean, maximum and minimum 
have little to none economical interpretation. A standard deviation of 1.386 and a 
maximum of 10.5 and minimum of 3.09 indicate large differences in size between the 
airlines in our samples.  
 
4.1.6	  Fuel	  
The fuel variable ranges from zero to one and produce a mean of 0.223 that indicates 
that fuel on average occupy 22.3% of the company´s total sales. Our variable ranges 
from 2% to 49% and have a standard deviation on approximately 9%. This illustrates 
the importance of fuel hedging and low-fuel consuming aircrafts etc. since fuel-price 
fluctuations may produce strong competitive disadvantages/advantages.  
 
4.1.7	  Growth	  
We choose to use Tobin’s Q when doing the descriptive analysis of our samples 
growth prospects because it is easier to compare with other studies. Our sample 
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produced an average market-to-book ration of 1.8, which indicates that the market 
expects future growth in the industry despite the increasing difficulties that the 
industry has experienced in the last ten years. Frank and Goyal (2009) and Oftedal 
and Sorhus (2011) got similar values (1.78 and 1.59) in their US- and reference 
sample. This indicates that the airline industry on average is given the same growth 
prospects from the market as the general company. 
 
4.1.8	  Leasing	  
The leasing variable has a mean of 0.067 and is computed by dividing leasing costs 
by sales. This indicates that 6.7% of the average airline sales go to paying for leasing. 
The variable ranges from max 0.33 and 0 at the lowest. This is natural because some 
airlines own all their tangible assets, while others depend on leasing aircrafts and etc.  
 
4.1.9	  Financial	  Strength	  (risk	  proxy)	  
The risk proxy variable has a mean of 1.37 % with a standard deviation of 19.89%. 
The max and min values are 350 % and -30 %. Since the standard deviation is 
relatively small compared to the max and min levels, this may indicate that there are 
some extreme observations in our sample that influence the estimated econometric 
results.  
 
4.1.10	  Collinearity	  matrix	  
Multicollinearity refers to the state where there is positive/negative correlation 
between independent variables in a multiple regression model. (Wooldridge, 2009) 
When variables are highly correlated they express basically the same information. 
Statistically we do not want multicollinearity because if it exist, then independent 
variables are unnecessary and do not add any predictive value over each other. 
Generally, it is difficult to find variables that are not correlated with each other and as 
we can see from table 5 correlations between explanatory variables is also present in 
our sample. The highest correlation in our data sample is between risk and profit 
(0.6761). We will not omit any variable because of collinearity. For further 
information about effects etc. of presence of multicollinearity and is possible effect on 
our analysis, see attachment 7.4.1. 
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Table	  6:	  Collinearity	  matrix	  
 
 
4.2	  Analysis	  
 
4.2.1	  Pooled	  OLS	  
To test our hypothesis we started by conducting a pooled OLS regression. The 
estimated results obtained from the different models are cited in the table 7 below. We 
have applied robust standard errors to avoid a potential problem of biased t-statistics 
and p-values (homoscedasticity), which may be the case with regular OLS standard 
errors. We have applied this feature in all the forthcoming regressions.  
 
size 1.0000
profit -0.2423 1.0000
growth -0.2148 0.2744 1.0000
cva 0.1561 0.1495 -0.1130 1.0000
fuel -0.1046 -0.1702 0.1172 0.0879 1.0000
leasing -0.3818 -0.3083 0.0436 -0.2733 0.1517 1.0000
stockreturn -0.0427 0.0002 0.1649 -0.0225 0.0315 0.0221 1.0000
private1gov -0.0587 0.2832 0.0491 -0.0443 -0.1743 -0.2586 -0.0131 1.0000
lowcost1se 0.1065 0.1730 0.0678 0.0030 -0.0370 -0.3442 0.0421 0.4479 1.0000
rated1nonr 0.2176 -0.1836 -0.2352 -0.0031 -0.0822 -0.0444 -0.0474 -0.0002 -0.0366 1.0000
Financal Strength -0.1258 0.6761 0.1444 0.0544 -0.2097 -0.2651 -0.0166 0.2375 0.1394 -0.1086 1.0000
Correlation matrix
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Table	  7:	  Pooled	  OLS	  regression	  results	  for	  both	  the	  book-­‐leverage	  and	  market-­‐leverage	  model	  
 
 
R-squared represents the proportion of the total sample variation on the dependent 
variable that us explained by the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2009). R-
squared ranges from 0 to 1 where 1 are obtained if the model explains 100% of the 
sample variation. Hence, it is preferable that the model obtain a high R-squared. 
Adjusted R-squared control for the number of explanatory variables. As we can see, 
from table 6, book-leverage and market-leverage model have adjusted R-squared on 
respectively 15.2 % and 18.1 % .The models produce F-values of 9.711 and 9.562 
which imply that the overall model is satisfied (significant explanatory power). 
 
Variables Model 1 (Book) Model 2 (Market)
growth 0.0660 0.0303
(1.93) (1.10)
profit -0.362 -0.886*
(-1.40) (-2.42)
cva 0.537*** 0.469***
(5.85) (4.35)
size 0.0343** 0.0208
(2.98) (1.46)
fuel 0.0110 -0.285
(0.06) (-1.56)
leasing 1.458*** 1.103*
(3.56) (2.23)
privat 0.0409 0.0245
(1.52) (0.74)
lowcost -0.0597 -0.0744
(-1.91) (-1.75)
rated -0.00779 -0.00210
(-0.26) (-0.07)
financial strength 1.291 2.327
(1.00) (0.64)
Constant -0.133 0.0958
(-1.01) (0.59)
Observations 282 240
R-squared 0.182 0.216
Adjusted R-squared 0.152 0.181
F 9.711 9.562
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Pooled OLS
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4.2.2	  Discussion	  of	  results	  
Difference between Model 1 (book) and Model 2 (market): the magnitude of the 
coefficients in Model 2 is often smaller than the ones obtained from Model 1. A 
possible explanation may be that for example an increasing profitability will increase 
market value more than it affects the book value of equity, and therefore the effect on 
leverage becomes smaller in the situation where market value of equity is in the 
denominator. All coefficient interpretation is ceteris paribus (all other variables are 
kept constant). 
 
4.2.2.1	  Profit	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between profit and book-leverage. When the 
EBIT-sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage decreases by 
approx. 0.36 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of -1.40 and is not 
significantly different from zero on a 5, 1 or 0.1 % level.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between profit and market-leverage. When the 
EBIT-sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage decreases by 
approx. 0.886 percentage points. Economically this strong positive relationship is 
supported by the pecking order theory. Pecking order theory argues that increasing 
profitability increases the retained earnings available for investments. Since retained 
earnings are the cheapest way of funding new investments, high profitability implies 
less need of debt and lower degree of leverage. The coefficient has a t-value of -2.42 
and is significantly different from zero on a 5 % level. 
 
4.2.2.2	  Size	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between size and book-leverage. When size 
increases with 1 per cent, book-leverage increases by approx. 0.0003 percentage 
points. Economically this positive relationship is supported by the trade-off theory. 
Trade-off theory argues that increasing firm size will decrease the risk of default. This 
will induce firms to increase their debt tax shields because of the low bankruptcy 
costs. The coefficient has a t-value of 2.98 and is significantly different from zero on 
a 1 % level.  
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Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between size and market-leverage. When size 
increases with 1 per cent, book-leverage increases by approx. 0.0002 percentage 
points. The coefficient has a t-value of 1.46 and is not significantly different from 
zero on a 5, 1 or 0.1 % level.  
 
4.2.2.3	  CVA	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between CVA and book-leverage. When the 
tangible to total assets ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage 
increases by approx. 0.54 percentage points. Economically this strong positive 
relationship is supported by both the agency and trade-off theory. Trade-off theory 
argues that increasing CVA decreases the risk of default because of the high degree of 
collateral obtained from having a lot of fixed assets. This induces firms to increase 
their debt tax shields. The coefficient has a t-value of 5.85 and is significantly 
different from zero on a 0.1 % level.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between CVA and market-leverage. When the 
tangible to total assets ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage 
increases by approx. 0.47 percentage points. Economically this strong positive 
relationship is, as mentioned above, supported by both the agency and trade-off 
theory. The coefficient has a t-value of 4.35 and is significantly different from zero on 
a 0.1 % level.  
 
4.2.2.4	  Growth	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between growth and book-leverage. When the 
growth rate of total sales increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage increases 
by approx. 0.07 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of 1.93 and is not 
significantly different from zero on a 5% level.  
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Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between growth and market-leverage. When the 
growth rate increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage increases by approx. 
0.03 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of 1.1 and is not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
4.2.2.5	  Fuel	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between fuel and book-leverage. When the fuel to 
sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage increases by approx. 
0.0110 percentage points. Economically this positive relationship is not supported by 
any of the mentioned theories. One possible explanation may be that some airline 
companies have to take up debt in order to be able to pay for the future contracts of 
fuel. Another explanation may be that there is a positive link between fleet age and 
debt, and that old aircraft use more fuel than new. An econometric explanation may 
be that the coefficient is a victim of endogenity; hence, the coefficient has no 
explanatory power. The coefficient has a t-value of 0.06 and is as expected not 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between fuel and market-leverage. When the fuel 
to sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage decreases by approx. 
0.285 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of -1.56 and is not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
4.2.2.6	  Leasing	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a strong positive relationship between leasing and book-leverage. When 
the operational leasing cost to sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-
leverage increases by approx. 1.458 percentage points. Economically this strong 
positive relationship is contradicting our expectations of a negative relationship. Since 
a leased obligation is effectively adding leverage to the capital structure even though 
it is not stated on the balance sheet. Hence a leased obligation could trigger higher 
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financial distress and therefore lower leverage. The coefficient has a t-value of 3.56 
and is significantly different from zero on a 0.1 % level. A possible explanation may 
be that the leasing variable is a victim of endogenity, which implies that we cannot 
trust the obtained results.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between leasing and market-leverage. When the 
leasing cost to sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage increases 
by approx. 1.1 percentage points. Economically this strong positive relationship is, as 
mentioned above, not supported by the mentioned theories. The coefficient has a t-
value of 2.23 and is significantly different from zero on a 5 % level.  
 
4.2.2.7	  Private	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between the private dummy and book-leverage. 
When the private people own the more than 50% of the company shares, book-
leverage increases by approx. 0.041 percentage points. Economically this positive 
relationship is not supported by any of the mentioned theories that state that there 
should be a negative relationship between being privately owned and leverage. The 
coefficient has a t-value of 1.52 and is, as expected, not significantly different from 
zero. 
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between the private dummy and market-leverage. 
The coefficient has a t-value of 0.74 and is not significantly different from zero. 
 
4.2.2.8	  Low-­‐cost	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between the low-cost dummy and book-leverage. 
When the company follows a low cost strategy book-leverage decreases by approx. 
0.06 percentage points. Economically this negative relationship is supported by the 
mentioned theories. One explanation is that low-levered firms, assumed to have deep 
pockets, can engage in predatory practices especially in a highly competitive 
environment designed to financially exhaust highly levered rivals and drive them out 
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of the market. Hence, low-cost firms tend to have lower leverage than service airlines 
in order to have the possibility of predatory pricing. The coefficient has a t-value of -
1.91 and is not significantly different from zero. 
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between the low-cost dummy and market-
leverage. When the company follows a low-cost strategy market-leverage decreases 
by approx. 0.074 percentage points. Our theoretical framework supports this negative 
relationship. The coefficient has a t-value of -1.75 and is not significantly different 
from zero. 
 
4.2.2.9	  Rated	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between the rated dummy and book-leverage. 
When the company is rated by one of S&P, Moody’s and Fitch book-leverage 
decreases by approx. 0.008 percentage points. Economically this negative relationship 
is supported by the pecking order and agency theory. The negative relationship could 
be explained by a lower degree information asymmetry; hence, less cost when issuing 
equity. Another possible explanation is that when a firm is rated, this functions as a 
disciplinary effect towards the managers. Hence, there is less need of debt to 
discipline managers. This is supported by Kisgen´s (2008) findings, which state that 
firms issue less debt when they are close to rating changes.  
The coefficient has a t-value of -0.26 and is not significantly different from zero.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between the rated dummy and market-leverage. 
When the company follows a low-cost strategy market-leverage decreases by approx. 
0.002 percentage points. Our theoretical framework supports this negative 
relationship. The coefficient has a t-value of -0.5 and is not significantly different 
from zero. 
 
4.2.2.10	  Financial	  Strength	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
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We obtained a positive relationship between the risk proxy and book-leverage. The 
coefficient has a t-value of 1.0 and is not significantly different from zero.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between financial strength and market-leverage. 
A possible economical explanation is mentioned above. The coefficient has a t-value 
of 0.64 and is not significantly different from zero.  
 
4.2.3	  Summary	  Pooled	  OLS	  results	  
We obtain positive significant estimates for CVA and leasing for both models. We 
were surprised by the significant positive estimates to the leasing variables, which 
were the opposite of our expectations. Size was the only estimate other than CVA and 
leasing that had significant estimates in the book model. We obtained significant 
estimates for profit in the market model. It was surprising to find that growth 
produced no significant estimates, while profit and size only was significant for one 
of the models. We suspect that the pooled OLS regression may contain endogenous 
variables, unobservable constant effects and etc. that may affect our results. 	  
4.2.4	  Alternative	  method	  to	  analyse	  the	  data	  
Because of the potential complications and pitfalls caused by conducting a pooled 
OLS we chose to apply alternative models in order to be able to more robustly explain 
how the different determinants affect capital structure. As mentioned in part 3.3.2 we 
can choose between either the FE or RE model. Which one we choose depends on the 
outcome of a Hausman test.  
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Table	  8:	  Hausman	  test;	  Book-­‐leverage	  model	  
 
 
The Hausman test of the book model given by table 8 produced a Prob > chi2 of 
0.000 which imply that we can reject H0: FE and RE OK when testing against Hi: FE 
OK and RE not OK. Since there is explanatory power in the unobservable factor that 
can be used in the RE regression + that we are able to use time constant dummy 
variables we prefer to use RE instead of FE when H0 cannot be rejected. Since H0 
was rejected, we have to eliminate all of the unobservable fixed effect. Hence, we use 
FE regressions when testing Model 1 (book). This also implies that there exist a zero 
conditional mean problem in our pooled regression (hence, assumption 4 is invalid), 
and the obtained pooled OLS results have no explanatory power. 
Table	  9:	  Hausman	  test;	  Market	  model	  
 
HAUSMAN TEST Model 1 (book)
(b) 8B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(v_b-V_B))
Fixed1_1 Rel1_1 Difference
size .0263543 .0294046 -.0030504 .0184725
profit -.455991 -.430086 -.025905 .0812441
cva .7221116 .6752073 .0469043 .0537808
fuel -.0897121 -.0708331 -.018879 .0817971
marketbook -.0187855 -.0046906 -.0140949 .0043077
leasing -.269046 .2656113 -.5346573 .2455438
risk 1.642183 1.528878 .1133051 .2504927
                b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =       79.27
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
--Coefficients--
(b) 8B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(v_b-V_B))
Fixed1_1 Rel1_1 Difference
size .1338596 .0800429 .0538167 .0190621
profit -1.124053 -.9596024 -.1644507 .061222
cva .5285894 .5729657 -.0443763 .0500923
fuel -.5847307 -.3751881 -.2095425 .0726358
marketbook -.0778349 -.0548665 -.0229685 .
leasing -.0499921 .6293005 -.6792926 .270575
risk 4.766876 4.120449 .6464275 .
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =       20.24
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0051
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
HAUSMAN TEST Model 2 (market)
--Coefficients--
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When we performed the Hausman test for the market model given in table 9 we could 
reject H0 on a five per cent level. Prob > chi2 was 0.005. We choose to use the FE 
model for model 2 (market). As with model 1, this implies that OLS assumption 4 is 
invalid.  
 
Table	  10:	  FE	  regression;	  Book-­‐leverage	  and	  Market	  model	  
 
 
4.2.5	  Discussion	  of	  results	  
We are in this part of the thesis going systematically go through the results obtained 
from the FE regression. All interpretations are ceteris paribus (all other variables are 
held constant). 
 
4.2.5.1	  Profit	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between profit and book-leverage. When the 
EBIT-sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage decreases by 
approx. 0.456 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of -1.51 and is not 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
Model 1 (Book) Model 2 (Market)
size 0.0264 0.134**
(0.59) (3.61)
profit -0.456 -1.124***
(-1.51) (-3.94)
cva 0.722*** 0.529*
(4.22) (2.43)
fuel -0.0897 -0.585**
(-0.25) (-3.45)
marketbook -0.0188 -0.0778***
(-0.83) (-3.83)
leasing -0.269 -0.0500
(-0.51) (-0.05)
risk 1.642 4.767*
(1.50) (2.11)
Constant -0.0305 -0.730*
(-0.09) (-2.09)
Observations 282 240
R-squared 0.205 0.331
Adjusted R-squared  0.185 0.311
F 6.608 9.857
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
FE regression
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We obtained a negative relationship between profit and market-leverage. When the 
EBIT-sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage decreases by 
approx. 1.124 percentage points. Economically this strong negative relationship is 
supported by the pecking order theory. Since retained earnings are the cheapest way 
raising funds for new investments (because of information asymmetry) the company 
will use earnings instead of debt. Low profitable firms have less retained earnings to 
use for new investments; hence, they take on more debt. The coefficient has a t-value 
of -3.94 and is significantly different from zero on a 0.01 % level. 
 
Previous studies: Rajan et.al (1995), Titman et.al (1988), Psillaki et.al (2009), (Gaud 
et.al (2005), Frank et.al (2007) and Oftedal & Sorhus (2011) also find a negative 
relationship between debt ratio and profitabiliy. Hence, our findings are in line with 
previous studies. 
4.2.5.2	  Size	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between size and book-leverage. When size 
increases with 1 per cent, book-leverage increases by approx. 0.00026 percentage 
points. The coefficient has a t-value of 0.59 and is not significantly different from 
zero.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between size and market-leverage. When size 
increases with 1 per cent, book-leverage increases by approx. 0.0013 percentage 
points. Economically, as mentioned in 4.2.2.2, this positive relationship is supported 
by the trade-off theory. The coefficient has a t-value of 3.61 and is significantly 
different from zero on a 1% level.  
 
Previous studies: Rajan et.al (1995), Psillaki et.al (2009), (Gaud et.al (2005), Frank 
et.al (2007) and Oftedal & Sorhus (2011) also find a positive relationship between 
debt ratio and size. Hence, our findings are in line with most previous studies. 
4.2.5.3	  CVA	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between CVA and book-leverage. When the 
tangible to total assets ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage 
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increases by approx. 0.722 percentage points. Economically this strong positive 
relationship is supported by both the agency and trade-off theory as mentioned in 
4.2.2.3. The coefficient has a t-value of 4.22 and is significantly different from zero 
on a 0.1 % level.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between CVA and market-leverage. When CVA 
increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage increases by approx. 0.529 
percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of 2.43 and is significantly different 
from zero on a 5 % level.  
 
Previous studies: Rajan et.al (1995), (Gaud et.al (2005), Frank et.al (2007) and 
Oftedal & Sorhus (2011) also find a positive relationship between debt ratio and 
CVA. Hence, our findings are in line with most previous studies. 
 
4.2.5.4	  Growth	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between growth and book-leverage. When 
growth rate in total sales increases with 1 percentage point book-leverage decreases 
by approx. 0.066 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of -0.83 and is not 
significantly different from zero on a 5 % level.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between growth and market-leverage. When 
growth rate increases with 1 per cent market-leverage decreases by approx. 0.078 
percentage points. . Economically this negative relationship could be explained by the 
all the mentioned theories. The trade-off theory explains this negative relationship by 
using the following argumentation: Firms with more investment opportunities will 
have incentives to use less leverage in order to avoid possible underinvestment 
problems/costs. The negative relationship could also be explained by the pecking 
order theory. When looking into the future of the firm, managers would like to keep a 
low degree of debt in order to avoid new equity offerings when needing capital to 
potential investments. The coefficient has a t-value of -3.83 and is significantly 
different from zero on a 0.1 per cent level.  
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Previous studies: Rajan et.al (1995), (Gaud et.al (2005), Frank et.al (2007) and 
Oftedal & Sorhus (2011) also find a negative relationship between debt ratio and 
growth prospects. Hence, our findings are in line with previous studies. 
 
4.2.5.5	  Fuel	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between fuel and book-leverage. When the fuel 
to sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, book-leverage decreases by approx. 
0.09 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of -0.25 and is not significantly 
different from zero.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between fuel and market-leverage. When the fuel 
to sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage decreases by approx. 
0.585 percentage points. Economically this negative relationship is supported by the 
trade-off theory, agency cost theory and pecking-order theory. The negative 
relationship is in the agency theory explained by that energy-price volatility and high 
degrees of fuel consumption functions as a natural disciplinary factor on the managers 
of the company. According to the trade-off theory high fuel-to-sales ratio and volatile 
fuel prices increases the risk of becoming insolvent; hence, increasing bankruptcy 
costs which makes it optimal for the company to reduce their leverage. The 
coefficient has a t-value of -3.83 and is significantly different from zero on a 1 % 
level.  
 
4.2.5.6	  Leasing	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between leasing and book-leverage. When the 
operational leasing cost to sales ratio decrease with 1 percentage point, book-leverage 
decreases by approx. 0.27 percentage points. Economically this negative relationship 
is in line with our expectations. A leased obligation is effectively adding leverage to 
the capital structure even though it is not stated on the balance sheet. Hence a leased 
obligation could trigger higher financial distress and therefore lower leverage. The 
coefficient has a t-value of -0.51 and is not significantly different from zero on a 5 % 
level.  
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Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a negative relationship between leasing and market-leverage. When the 
leasing cost to sales ratio increases with 1 percentage point, market-leverage 
decreases by approx. 0.05 percentage points. The coefficient has a t-value of -0.05 
and is not significantly different from zero on a 5 % level. 
 
4.2.5.7	  Financial	  Strength	  
Model 1: Book-leverage 
We obtained a strong positive relationship between financial strength and book-
leverage. This implies that companies, which produce returns below the sample 
average (financial strength<0), ceteris paribus, will have less debt than those who 
produce returns above the sample average (financial strength>0). Hence, the lower 
financial strength a company have, the more risky it is. A possible explanation is that 
companies that produce returns below the sample average choose to reduce their 
leverage in order to decrease the probability of default. Companies with a financial 
strength factor above zero will use more debt in order to exploit the potential debt tax 
shield, which is in line with the trade-off theory. The coefficient has a t-value of 1.5 
and is not significantly different from zero.  
 
Model 2: Market-leverage 
We obtained a positive relationship between the financial strength factor and market-
leverage. Hence, more risky companies (financial strength < 0) use less debt. A 
possible economical explanation is mentioned above. The coefficient has a t-value of 
2.11 and is significantly different from zero on a 5 per cent level.  
 
Previous studies: Psillaki et.al (2009), Frank et.al (2007) and Oftedal & Sorhus 
(2011) also find a negative relationship between risk and debt ratio. Hence, our 
findings are in line with most previous studies. 
 
4.2.6	  Summary	  FE	  regression	  results	  
 When conducting the FE regression model, we got an adjusted R-squared of 18.5% 
for the book model and 31.1% for the market model. This tells us that the market 
model has a better predictive value of a company’s debt level than the book model. In 
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the market model six out of seven coefficients are significantly different from zero, 
while only one of the coefficients is significant in the book model. This may be 
explained by the argumentation that the market model is more forward looking than 
the book model, which implies that stakeholders base their decision on the future 
expectations rather than historical values.  A summary of the obtained results and 
predicted signs are given in table 9. We have also included the pooled OLS estimates 
for comparison. 
 
Table	  11:	  Summary	  of	  predicted	  and	  estimated	  signs	  
 
4.2.7	  Further	  information	  concerning	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  
When testing for serial collinearity in the explanatory variables we found evidence of 
positive serial correlation (see attachment 7.4). As mentioned in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) there may be problems with autocorrelation when conducting this kind of 
analysis. They found a positive relationship between leverage, asset tangibility and 
market-to-book, but the results was not significant and strongly autocorrelated. As a 
consequence we run a RE AR (1) regression for both models. This is a regression that 
takes into account the autocorrelation problem. The estimated coefficients were close 
to the ones obtained from the regular FE regressions but some of the estimates 
became more significant etc. We will not investigate this further since we believe this 
is beyond the scoop of our thesis. 
 
Table	  12:	  Comparing	  AR(1)	  FE	  regression	  results	  with	  regular	  FE	  results 
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4.3	  Testing	  hypothesis	  
In this part of the assignment we are going to test which of the three mentioned 
theories (agency cost, trade-off and pecking-order) that is most accurate in their 
predictions according to our estimated coefficients. For this purpose we have chosen 
five of the most acknowledge variables in capital structure theory. We will use the 
result obtained from the FE regression. 
 
Hypothesis 1 Trade-off theory 
H1.1 – CVA 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and CVA 
H0: There is a negative relationship between leverage and CVA 
Asset tangibility has a positive relationship for both the market- and book model in 
our sample. In the market model we can reject H0 with 5 per cent significance level. 
In the book model we can see from the results that we will observe a positive relation 
in at least 99.9 % of the time. This is in line with the trade-off theory predictions.  
 
 
 
FE (market) AR(1) FE (market) FE (book) AR(1) FE (book)
growth -0.0778*** -0.0828 -0.0188 -0.022
(-3.83) (-1.79) (-0.83) (-0.79)
size 0.134** 0.133*** 0.0264 0.0317
-3.61 -4.1 -0.59 -1.03
profit -1.124*** -0.958*** -0.456 -0.754***
(-3.94) (-3.48) (-1.51) (-4.07)
cva 0.529* 0.472** 0.722*** 0.527***
-2.43 -3 -4.22 -4.33
fuel -0.585** -0.536** -0.0897 -0.182
(-3.45) (-2.77) (-0.25) (-1.12)
leasing -0.05 0.913 -0.269 0.0996
(-0.05) -1.34 (-0.51) -0.2
financial strength 4.767* 5.276** 1.642 2.300*
-2.11 -2.88 -1.5 -2.51
_cons -0.730* -0.764*** -0.0305 0.0514
(-2.09) (-3.85) (-0.09) -0.52
N 240 207 282 245
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H1.2 – Size 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and size 
H0: There is a negative relationship between leverage and size 
Size has a positive relationship for both the market- and book-leverage model. In the 
market model we can reject H0 with 1 per cent significance. Hence, there is a 99 % 
probability that H0 is not satisfied. In the book model we can see from the results that 
we will not observe a positive relationship in at least 95 % of the time. The market 
model is in line with the trade-off theory, while the book model is indefinite.   
 
H1.3 – Profitability 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and profitability 
H0: There is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 
Profitability has a negative relationship for both the market- and book model. We 
cannot reject H0 for either the book or market model. The market model is not in line 
with the trade-off theory because it is negative at least 99.9 % of the time, while the 
book model is indefinite.   
 
H1.4 – Financial strength 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
There is a negative relationship between risk and leverage for both models. When a 
company produces lower returns (EBIT/Total Assets) than the average return 
obtained from the whole sample, we classify this company as being more risky than 
the general company. The intuition behind this is that companies with lower returns 
than average will, in the long run, have more problems operating in a market with 
tough competition than the most profitable companies. The book model produces 
indefinite results, while we can reject H0 for the market model. Our results are in line 
with the static trade-off theory. 
 
H1.5 – Growth 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and growth 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and growth 
Indefinite results in the book model while there is a probability of 99.9 per cent that 
we obtain a negative sign on the growth variable in the market model. This is inline 
with the trade-off theory. 
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Hypothesis 2 Pecking order theory 
H2.1 – CVA 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and CVA 
H0: There is a positive relationship between leverage and CVA 
Asset tangibility has a positive relationship for both the market- and book model in 
our sample. In the market model we cannot reject H0 with 5 per cent significance. 
Hence, there is a 95 % probability that H0 is satisfied. In the book model we can see 
from the results that we will observe a positive relation in at least 99.9 % of the time. 
This is not in line with the pecking order theory. 
 
H2.2 – Size 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and size 
H0: There is a positive relationship between leverage and size 
Size has a positive relationship for both the market- and book model. In the market 
model we cannot reject H0 with 1 per cent significance. Hence, there is a 99 % 
probability that H0 is satisfied. In the book model we get indefinite results. The 
market model is not in line with the pecking order theory, while the book model is 
indefinite.   
 
H2.3 – Profitability 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 
H0: There is a positive relationship between leverage and profitability 
Profitability has a negative relationship for both the market- and book model. In the 
market model we will observe a positive sign on the profitability variable at least 99.9 
per cent of the time. In the book model produces indefinite results and we cannot 
reject either H0 or Hi. The market model is in line with the pecking order theory, 
while the book model is indefinite.   
 
H2.4 – Financial strength 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and the risk proxy. 
H0: There is a positive/no relationship between leverage and the risk proxy. 
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There is a negative relationship between the risk proxy and leverage for both models.  
The book model produces indefinite results, while we can reject H0 for the market 
model. Our results are in line with the pecking order theory. 
 
H2.5 – Growth 
Hi: There is a relationship between leverage and growth 
H0: There is a no relationship between leverage and growth 
Indefinite results in the book model while there is a probability of 99.9 per cent that 
we obtain a negative sign on the growth variable in the market model. This is in line 
with the pecking-order theory since it may support both a negative and positive sign. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 Agency cost theory 
H3.1 – Profitability 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between leverage and profitability 
H0: There is a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 
Profitability has a negative relationship for both the market- and book model. In the 
book model produces indefinite results and we cannot reject either H0 or Hi. The 
market model is not in line with the agency theory, while the book model is indefinite.   
 
H3.2 – Financial Strength 
Hi: There is a relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
H0: There is a not relationship between leverage and the risk proxy 
There is a negative relationship between the risk proxy and leverage for both models. 
The book model produces indefinite results, while we can reject H0 for the market 
model. Our results are in line with the agency theory since it may support both a 
positive and negative sign. 
 
H3.3 – Growth 
Hi: There is a negative relationship between leverage and growth 
H0: There is a no/positive relationship between leverage and growth 
Indefinite results in the book model while there is a probability of 99.9 per cent that 
we obtain a negative sign on the growth variable in market model. This is inline with 
the agency cost theory. 
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4.3.1	  Summary	  of	  the	  testing	  of	  hypothesis	  	  
Table	  13:	  Summary	  of	  predicted	  and	  estimated	  signs	  for	  the	  five	  chosen	  variables	  
 
None of the mentioned models are able to explain all of our obtained results. This is 
in line with previous studies, which state that none of the theories are superior. Trade-
off theory could explain the signs for three out of five coefficients, while pecking-
order theory could explain two out of five. Agency cost could explain two out of three 
coefficients.  
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5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  
We are in this final part of the thesis going to briefly go through our most interesting 
findings and summarize an answer to the problems that we wanted to address. 
 
The most interesting findings are: 
• When conducting the FE regression model, we got an adjusted R-squared of 
18.5% for the book model and 31.1% for the market model. This tells us that 
the market model has a better predictive value of a company’s debt level than 
the book model.  
• In the market model six out of seven coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, while only one of the coefficients is significant in the book model. 
This may be explained by the argumentation that the market model is more 
forward looking than the book model, which implies that stakeholders base 
their decision on the future expectations rather than historical values.  
• Our significant signs from the FE regression correspond well to previous 
studies, and we do not observe any airline industry specific differences.  
• We found a negative significant relationship between our fuel variable and 
debt ratio. This may imply that companies with a high energy-intensive 
consumption have more operational risk because of the volatile prices of 
energy. Hence, they have a lower optimal debt level. 
• None of the mentioned models are able to explain all of our obtained results. 
This is in line with previous studies, which state that none of the theories are 
superior. Trade-off theory could explain the signs for three out of five 
coefficients, while pecking-order theory could explain two out of five. Agency 
cost could explain two out of three coefficients.  
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5.1	  Suggestions	  to	  future	  research	  
It would be interesting to research whether the debt ratio of an energy intensive firm 
would decreases with a higher use of energy to sale. Theoretical framework argues 
that this would increase the operational risk and therefore decrease the optimal debt 
level. Is this common consensus or is our obtained result only airline industry 
specific? 
 
Another further research may be to interview and/or surveys of CFOs from the sample 
firms regarding the variables. Are they emphasizing the same variables when they 
make their financial decisions? Do they have a debt ratio target that influences their 
financing decisions? This could lead to some interesting answers and a new angle to 
capital structure decisions.  	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7.	  Attachments	  
 
7.1	  ASSUMPTIONS	  OLS:	  
1) Linear in parameters. This assumption states that the model can be written as ! = !! + !!!! + !!!! +⋯+ !!!! + ! , where !! ,   !! , …,   !!  are the unknown 
coefficients of interest and u is an unobservable random error (residuals).  
 
2) Random sampling. When collecting a random sample of n observations, (xi1, xi2, 
…, xik, yi) where i = 1,2,..,n the sample will give a good representation of the overall 
population.  If this assumption is not valid, and the sample is non random, this may 
result in biased coefficients that have no explanatory power for the overall population.  
 
3) No perfect collinearity: This assumption demand that non of the independent 
variables in sample (xi1, xi2, …, xik) where i = 1,2,..,n are constant, and that there do 
not exist a perfect linear relationship between any of them. The background of this 
assumption is that: -­‐ In order to find a relationship between the independent and dependent variable 
we need to have variation in the independent variables -­‐ We cannot study the ceteris paribus effect of changes in one independent 
variable on the dependent variable if the independent variable is perfectly 
correlated with other independent variables. 
High degrees of collinearity between the different independent variables may 
result in inference “problems” and reduce the quality of the explanatory power of 
the calculated coefficients. 
 
4) Zero conditional mean. This assumption states that the residuals u has an expected 
value of zero given any values of the independent variables. Mathematically this is 
shown as:  E(u|x1,x2, …,xk) = 0.  
 
This is a crucial assumption in order for the OLS coefficients to be unbiased. When a 
coefficient is unbiased then the expected value of the estimated coefficient is equal to 
the true population coefficient. Hence; ! !! = !! , ! = 0,1,… , !  If our estimated 
coefficients are biased ! !! ≠ !!  our model are no longer BLUE. 
	   81	  
 
5) Homoskedasticity. This assumption states that the variance of the residuals are the 
same given any values of the explanatory variables. Mathematically this assumption 
is written as: !"# ! !!, . . , !! = !! 
 
This assumption is important because it implies that the standard deviation of the 
different unknown coefficients !!,  !!, …,  !! are unbiased, which again imply that we 
may use inference to test whether the diff coefficients are statistically significant or 
not.  
 
6) Normality. States that the residuals (the error term) are normally distributed. 
Hence: !~! 0,!! . This assumption is not a part of the Gauss Markov assumption, 
but if valid, normality of residuals will imply that 4) and 5) are valid; hence: !!~! !! ,!"! !! . This is not a crucial assumption and may be dropped if we have 
a reasonable large sample size.  	  
7.2	  ASSUMPTIONS	  FIRST	  DIFFERENCE	  (FD)	  and	  Fixed	  Effects	  (FE):	  	  
1) For each i, the model is: * !!" = !! + !!!"!!!" +⋯+ !!"#!!"# + !! +!!" , ! = 1,… ,! 
2) Random sample in the cross section 
3) The independent variables cannot be constant through time (∆!!,!,..,! ≠ 0), and 
there cannot exist a (perfect) linear relationship among the different 
explanatory variables (!"## !!"# , !!"# < 1, where ! ≠ !). 
4) The independent explanatory variables are strictly exogenous conditional on 
the unobserved effect (! !!"|!! , !!"# = 0). Hence, when we control for the 
unobserved fixed parameter ai, then !"## !!"# ,!!" = 0. 
5) The variance of the different error, conditional on all explanatory variables is 
constant; !"# ∆!!" !!"# = !!, ! = 2,… ,!. 
6) For all ! ≠ ! , the difference in idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated 
(conditional on all explanatory variables): Hence; !"# Δ!!" ,Δ!!"|!!"# = 0 
7) Conditional on !!"# , the Δ!!"  are independent and identically distributed 
normal random variables. 
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If 1) à 6) hold, the estimated coefficients are BLUE and consistent. 
If 7) does not hold, we can still use t- and F-distribution because we say that they are 
asymptotic approximations.  
 
7.3	  ASSUMPTIONS	  RANDOME	  EFFECTS	  (RE):	  
1) Linear in parameters: We should be able to write our model as: !!" = !! +!!!"!!!" +⋯+ !!"#!!"# + !! + !!" , ! = 1,… ,! 
2) Random sampling 
3) There are no perfect linear relationship between/among the explanatory 
variables 
4) ! !!"|!! , !!"# = 0 and the expected value of ai given all explanatory 
variables is constant. Hence; ! !!|!!"# = !! 
5) !"# !!"|!! , !!"# = !"# !!" = !!!,  for all ! = 1,… ,! and the variance of 
ai given all explanatory variables is constant !"# !!|!!"# = !!!. 
6) For all ! ≠ !, the idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated (conditional on all 
explanatory variables and ai): Hence; !"## !!" ,!!"|!! , !!"# = 0 
7.4	  NOTES	  TO	  THE	  ECONOMETRIC	  ANALYSIS	  
We started our analysis by running the regular pooled OLS regression on the entire 
sample. Model 1.1 and 1.2 produced some significant values etc. but we could not 
rely on the result because we had not tested whether the OLS assumptions were valid. 
First we wanted to test whether the model was a victim of serial correlation. We 
tested for serial collinearity by:  
 
1. Running the OLS regression of market-/book-leverage on all the explanatory 
variables and obtaining the residuals. 
2. Running the regression of !!  !"  !!!! for all t = 2, …, n. 
We obtained a correlation of 0.81, which was significant (p-value = 0.000). We got 
the same result when using the method without strictly exogenous regressors. This 
correlation may be caused by the unobservable factor and we therefor choose not to 
rely on the pooled OLS results and use either RE or FE regressions instead because 
we assume these to produce more “safe” results.  
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One important OLS assumptions is the zero conditional mean assumption that states 
that the expected value of the error term !! is zero conditional on all the explanatory 
variables; hence, ! !!|! = 0. Hence, the explanatory variables are exogenous. If !! = ! + !! and ! !!|! = 0 the expected value of unobservable fixed effect (a) has 
to be 0 conditional to X in order for the assumption to hold. This is a strong and 
possible unrealistic assumption. In our sample for example efficiency, which can be a 
part of a, may be correlated with profits and therefor make the zero conditional mean 
assumption invalid. Since we suspect the unobservable factor to be present (from 
intuition and by the correlation between  !!  and !!!!), using either RE or FE can 
produce more certain results that do not break the zero conditional mean assumption. 
A consequence of this assumption being invalid is that the estimated results are biased 
and useless.  
 
Appendix	  1:	  Test	  of	  serial	  correlation	  with	  strictly	  exogenous	  regressors	  for	  the	  book	  model 
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Appendix	  2:	  Test	  of	  serial	  correlation	  without	  strictly	  exogenous	  regressors	  for	  the	  book	  model 
 
 
Appendix	  3:	  Test	  of	  serial	  correlation	  with	  strictly	  exogenous	  regressors	  for	  the	  market	  model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
!"#$%&'$()$*#+$,-(./&0.1&')(*.0*.))&*)
!"#$%&'()*&*$%&'()&+(#*&*$,(!-").//-$012"$3%"+$+"(014#$5!/31)$67($!10-8$!/.%0)
914"(!$!"#!"001/4 :%,."!$/3$/.0 ;<*
=>$$?8$$$;;@A BBC<D
E!/.$F$= DCDDDD
GH0I%(!"J DCKLL*
G//)$MNO DC**KLL
G/.%0)P
%&'()*&* Q/"3C N)JC$O!!C ) EFR)R SLBT$Q/43C U4)"!7(+V
%&'()&+(#*&* C@;;;D;B CD<*<KBW *LC@W DCDDD C?<DBDB@ CLDW@LL;
,(!-").//- HCDDKWB;; CD<K*<DB HDC*< DC@L* HCDL?;KD* CD@<BBB?
012" CDDWW*BK CDDLDB*B DCW? DC?*< HCD*<B*?L CD;**<L;
3%"+ CDL<<KK< CDL<LD*? *CDD DCW;* HCDL;B*W C;@*<<B@
+"(014# HC*K;*@BW C;??@LWW HDCB@ DCBKD HC?DL?D;< CW@BWW*?
5!/31) HC**;?K;L C*<W;*;* HDC?L DC<W; HCWL<L;B< C*KLWLLK
67( HCD*;*<*B CDK*<;KB HDC;D DC@<W HC*WW*KKB C*D@@@WB
!10- HCLK*WD;* *CWD<DD* HDC?< DC<K; HWCBWDB *CKD?@LK
6/40 HCDW*;*D@ C*DWBKK? HDCWD DC?KW HC;WB;K;; C*?;@<DK
!"#$%&'()$*(+,)-$%$&$.$),*$(+,)-$%/00-(1)02#%(3.,(4#5$(2"$&(&$,4#6*()#4-
1)$7#3%("89,%:8;<()$4
/'4(30+1,6'=(*$6("89,%8&,*:8;(>("89,%:8;?86@:A
!"#$%&'$(#)$*+&,-./,0.1'&(,/(,''.('
)$*("89,%:8;("89,%8&,*:8;<()0/"4%
B#6$,)()$*)$44#06 C"+/$)(02(0/4 ;DE
F?((:<(((;DDA ;G:H:E
I)0/(J(F D
K@4!",)$7 DHLMEL
K00%(NOP DH:QGER
K0/"4%S
"89,%:8;(T U0$2H O%7H(P))H % IJT%T
"89,%8&,*:8;(T DHRQVDDDQ DHDEQ;L:V :RHDM D DHML;R:RE DHV;Q;VQ:
83064(T DHDDG:VQM DHDDGRGGM DHGE DHQL @DHD:D:QG: DHD;VLDMQ
WGLX(U062H(Y6%$).,&Z
	   85	  
Appendix	  4:	  Test	  of	  serial	  correlation	  without	  strictly	  exogenous	  regressors	  for	  the	  market	  model 
 
Another GM assumption that is important is the constant variance conditional on X 
assumption and that the variance is uncorrelated with the previous period’s variance. 
Given that we in panel data repeatedly observe the same companies in different 
periods, it is typically unrealistic to assume that the error term is from diff. periods are 
uncorrelated. Recall that !! = ! + !!  and that !  is constant through time. This 
implies that !"# !! + ! X = !! which then imply that !"## !!!,!!!!! ≠ 0. Hence, 
OLS is inefficient compared to an estimator that exploits the possibility the 
correlation over time. We therefor choose to use RE or FE depending on the result of 
the Hausman test.  
7.4.1	  MULTICOLLINEARITY	  
Multicollinearity does not violate any of our assumptions as long as it is not +/- 1. 
The presence of multicollinearity between two variables may result in their 
corresponding variance estimates to be two large (Wooldridge, 2009), which again 
will have implications toward individual statistical inference on these variables. The 
other explanatory variables will not be affected by the collinearity between the 
mentioned variables. Omitting a variable with strong correlation toward the other 
variables may result in omitted variable bias, which may result in a violation of the 
zero conditional mean assumption.  
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